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NOTES
Bulk Sales-Transferee's Duty to Make Careful Inquiry of the Trans-
feror's Creditors Abolished
In Adrian Tabin Corp. v. Climax Boutique, Inc.,' the New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that under section 6-104(3)2 of
the Uniform Commercial Code a transferee in a bulk transfer, who
receives an affidavit stating that the transferor has no creditors and who
is without actual knowledge of any, can rely upon the affidavit without
having to make careful inquiry into the possible existence of any credi-
tors. This holding abolished New York's long-standing "careful in-
quiry" requirement 3 and dispensed with the notification requirement of
section 6-105.4
'40 App. Div. 2d 146, 338 N.Y.S.2d 59 (1972).
2The major purposes of Article 6 of the Uniform Commercial Code are stated in the Official
Comment to section 6-101 as follows:
1. This Article attempts to simplify and make uniform the bulk sales laws of the
states ....
2. . . . Their central purpose is to deal with two common forms of commercial
fraud, namely:
(a) The merchant . . . who sells out his stock in trade to a friend for less
than it is worth, pays his creditors less than he owes them and hopes to come
back into the business ....
(b) The merchant, . . . who sells out his stock in trade . pockets the
proceeds, and disappears leaving his creditors unpaid.
Section 6-104 places responsibilities upon the parties to a bulk transfer as follows:
(1) A bulk transfer subject to this Article is ineffective against any creditor of
the transferor unless:
(a) The transferee requires the transferor to furnish a list of his existing
creditors prepared as stated in this section; and
(2) The list of creditors must be signed and sworn to or affirmed by the transferor
or his agent. It must contain the names and business addresses of all creditors of the
transferor ....
(3) Responsibility for the completeness and accuracy of the list of creditors rests
on the transferor, and the transfer is not rendered ineffective by errors or omissions
therein unless the transferee is shown to have had knowledge.
3The cases constituting authority for the careful inquiry requirement are: Klein v. Schwartz,
128 N.Y.S.2d 177 (Sup. Ct. 1953); Willner Butter & Egg Corp. v. Roth, 192 Misc. 970, 83
N.Y.S.2d 16 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Carl Ahlers, Inc. v. Dingott, 173 Misc. 873, 18 N.Y.S.2d 434 (Sup.
Ct. 1940); Marcus v. Knitzer, 168 Misc. 9, 4 N.Y.S.2d 308 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Heilmann v. Powelson,
101 Misc. 230, 167 N.Y.S. 662 (Sup. Ct. 1917). All of these cases were decided before the Uniform
Commercial Code was adopted in New York.
4UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-105 [hereinafter cited as UCC] provides in pertinent part
as follows: "In addition to the requirements of the preceding section, any bulk transfer subject to
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Plaintiff Adrian Tabin Corp. was a creditor of L.D.J. Dresses, Inc.
(the transferor) which sold its business in bulk to defendant Warman,
who then resold the same to defendant Climax Boutique, Inc. (the trans-
feree). Prior to the consummation of the sale the transferee received an
affidavit signed by the transferor's president which stated that the trans-
feror had no creditors.5 Creditor Adrian Tabin Corp., upon learning of
the sale, brought an action to have the sale set aside for failure to receive
notice of the transaction from the transferee as required under section
6-105. The trial court voided the sale, holding that a transferee must
make a careful inquiry into the existence of creditors of the transferor
by examining the transferor's books and questioning the transferor as
to the source of the items transferred in bulk. Since the transferee here
failed to make such an inquiry, the court held the sale was ineffective.
The appellate court reversed, holding that a transferee is under no
duty to make a careful inquiry. The court found that even though New
York had required such an inquiry under its pre-UCC bulk sales act,'
section 6-104(3), which had no counterpart under the pre-UCC law,
places the responsibility for the completeness and accuracy of the list
of creditors upon the transferor. A transfer is not rendered ineffective
by errors in the list unless the transferee has knowledge of them.' Since
here the transferee lacked knowledge of the plaintiff creditor, he had
complied with the requirement of notification of creditors' by obtaining
an affidavit from the transferor stating that he had none.
The dissent insisted that section 6-104(3) did not remove the careful
inquiry requirement.' The dissenter relied upon New York annotations
to section 6-104 stating that subsection three was merely declaratory of
prior New York law and citing the cases invoking the careful inquiry
requirement."0 Furthermore, the dissent argued, a transferee of an entire
this Article . . . is ineffective against any creditor of the transferor unless at least ten days before
he takes possession of the goods or pays for them, .... the transferee gives notice of the transfer
5The transferee had its attorney inquire of the transferor's attorney as to creditors and
searched the public records for possible liens against the transferor. The majority said these actions
constituted careful inquiry. 40 App. Div. 2d at_......., 338 N.Y.S.2d at 62. However, the trial court
had held that the transferee should have requested an examination of the transferor's books and
questioned the source of the garments involved in the sale. Id. at -, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 61.
'Law of April 23, 1914, ch. 507, § 1, [1914] N.Y. Laws 2017 (repealed 1964), quoted note 17
infra.
740 App. Div. 2d at - 338 N.Y.S.2d at 61.
'UCC § 6-105, quoted note 4 supra.
140 App. Div. 2d at _ 338 N.Y.S.2d at 62.
1"N.Y.U.C.C. § 6-104 (McKinney 1964), N.Y. Annotation 3. The annotation states that § 6-
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business knows that the transferor probably has some creditors, and
without an inquiry, at least into the sources of the inventory, "the
opportunity for fraud upon creditors is too great.""
THE NEW YORK EXPERIENCE
As mentioned above, cases interpreting the pre-UCC New York
bulk sales act'2 had held that the transferee could rely upon an affidavit
of the transferor that the latter had no creditors if the transferee made
a careful inquiry and he otherwise lacked knowledge of any such credi-
tors. 3 However, close examination discloses that the careful inquiry
requirement was adopted and subsequently affirmed on the basis of
mistaken use of precedent. The original New York bulk sales act14
obligated the transferee to notify any creditors discoverable by the exer-
cise of "reasonable diligence." That first statute was declared unconsti-
tutional in Wright v. Hart.'5 In a dissenting opinion to Wright, Judge
Vann stated not only that the bulk sales act was constitutional, but also
that a transferee was thereby under a duty to make "careful inquiry"
as to the existence of creditors of the transferor.6 When the New York
legislature passed a second bulk sales act, it did not include the reasona-
ble diligence provision of the original act, 7 only requiring the transferee
104(3) is "[n]ew to the statute, but declaratory of the New York law..." citing most of the cases
cited note 3 supra.
"140 App. Div. 2d at ____ 338 N.Y.S.2d at 63.
"Law of April 23, 1914, ch. 507, § 1, [1914] N.Y. Laws 2017 (repealed 1964).
"Cases cited note 3 supra.
"The text of that law provided in relevant part as follows:
Section 1. A sale of any portion of a stock of merchandise other than in the ordinary
course of trade . . . of the seller's business . . . shall be fraudulent and void as against
the creditors of the seller, unless . . . the seller and the purchaser shall . . . make full,
explicit inquiry of the seller as to name and place of residence. . . of each and every
creditor of the seller. . . and. . . in good faith notify. . . each of the seller's creditor's
of whom the purchaser has knowledge, or can with the exercise of reasonable diligence
acquire knowledge, of such proposed sale. ...
Law of April I1, 1902, ch. 528, § 1, [1902] N.Y. Laws 1249 (emphasis added).
"5182 N.Y. 330, 75 N.E. 404 (1905).
"Id. at 356, 75 N.E. at 414.
"The text of that law provided in relevant part as follows:
§ 44. Transfer of goods in bulk. 1. The sale, transfer or assignment in bulk of any
part or the whole of a stock of merchandise,. . . otherwise than in the ordinary course
of trade. . . shall be void as against the creditors of the seller. . . unless the purchaser
* .* demand and receive from the seller . . . a written list of the names and addresses
of the creditors of the seller . . . certified . . . under oath to be a full, accurate and
complete list of his creditors . . . and . . . notify . . . every creditor whose name and
address are stated in said list, or of which he has knowledge . . ..
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to notify the creditors listed or known to him. The new act was held
constitutional in Klein v. Maravelas.18 Speaking for the majority in
Klein, Judge Cardozo stated that the court was adopting the "argument
and the conclusion"' 9 of Judge Vann's dissent in Wright, but Cardozo
neither recited the careful inquiry requirement nor specifically said that
the court was adopting that part of the dissent. When stated by Judge
Vann, the careful inquiry requirement had a statutory basis, the reason-
able diligence requirement, but it had no such basis under the newer law.
Judge Cardozo seemingly only intended to state his concurrence with
the Wright dissenter's argument and conclusion that the provisions of
a bulk sales act did not deny equal protection. Yet all the subsequent
cases20 speaking on the issue have either directly or indirectly relied upon
the Wright dissent and Klein as precedent for the careful inquiry re-
quirement without examining the statutory basis or the merits of the
requirement. The court in Adrian Tabin did not base its holding on this
chain of misunderstanding, but held simply that section 6-104(3) of the
UCC made careful inquiry unnecessary.
TREATMENT OF THE ADRIAN TABIN ISSUE BY OTHER STATES
Nearly all of the states had enacted bulk sales acts prior to their
adoption of Article 6.21 Although they varied in detail, the statutes in
approximately two-thirds of the states were modeled after the New
York statute;22 the remainder followed the Pennsylvania statute,23
which included a provision making the transferee responsible for the
application of the purchase money pro rata among the creditors.24 The
overwhelming majority of cases held that where the transferor omitted
one or more creditors from the list, a transferee acting in good faith25
could rely upon the list and was not responsible for notifying the omitted
creditors.2 The commentators agreed.2 1 Where a transferee received a
Law of April 23, 1914, ch. 507, § 1, [19141 N.Y. Laws 2017 (repealed 1964).
18219 N.Y. 383, 114 N.E. 809 (1916).
"Id. at 387, 114 N.E. at 811.
21Cases cited note 3 supra.
213 S. WILLISTON, THE LAW GOVERNING SALES OF GOODS § 643, at 467 (rev. ed. 1948).
221d.; see text of the New York bulk sales act quoted note 17 supra.
13No. 141, [1919] Pa. Laws 262 (repealed 1953).
243 S. WILLISTON, supra note 21, § 643, at 468.
21In UCC § 1-201(19), "good faith" is defined as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction
concerned."
2"See, e.g., McKelvey v. John Schaap & Sons Drug Co., 143 Ark. 477, 220 S.W. 827 (1920);
Bione v. Bell, 221 I11. App. 434 (1920); Highway Sign & Servicing Co. v. Scott, 134 Kan. 658, 8
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transferor's affidavit that he had no creditors, some courts held that
such an affidavit would not suffice as a "list of creditors. 28 But the
courts that did accept the row-creditor affidavit as a list of creditors held
that the transferee unaware of creditors could rely upon the affidavit's
correctness and notify no one.29
After the adoption of Article 6, several commentators have con-
curred that if the transferee receives a no-creditor affidavit and is una-
ware of creditors, he can rely upon the sworn statement of the transferor
that there are no creditors to notify.3 As for judicial resolution of the
issue, there is only one other reported case, in addition to Adrian Tabin.
In Silco Automatic Vending Co. v. Howells," the court held that where
the transferee in a bulk sale of a tavern business received in affidavit
form a list of creditors on which the word "none" appeared in the space
for names, the only issue was whether the transferee otherwise knew that
the plaintiff was a creditor. The court concluded that the UCC did not
even apply to the contested transfer.32 Nevertheless, the court stated
that assuming the provisions of Article 6 did apply, the defendant trans-
ferees did not have sufficient notice that plaintiff was a creditor of the
transferor for the transaction to be set aside for failure to give notifica-
tion.3"
P.2d 391 (1932); McLaney v. Fortune Operating Co., 84 Nev. 491, 444 P.2d 505 (1968); Fitzhugh
v. Munnell, 92 Ore. 47, 179 P. 679 (1919); Axler v. Moran, 40 Del. County Ct. 401 (C.P. Del.
County Pa. 1953); Glantz v. Gardiner, 40 R.I. 297, 100 A. 913 (1917); Fischer v. Rio Tire Co., 65
S.W.2d 751 (Tex. Com. App. 1933);. Spokane Merchants Ass'n v. Koska, 118 Wash. 445, 203 P.
969 (1922).
2See, e.g., Brown, The Uniform Commercial Code Bulk Sales Article Compared With West
Virginia Law, 64 W. VA. L. REV. 385, 390 (1962); Hansell, Bulk Transfers Under Article 6 of
The Iowa Uniform Commercial Code, 19 DRAKE L. REV. 275, 284 (1970); Note, Bulk Sales and
Article 6, 20 WASH. & LE L. REV. 278, 284 (1963).
2 See text accompanying notes 41-43 infra.
"See, e.g., Mollen, Thompson & James Co. v. Klein, 27 Ohio Dec. 155, 19 Ohio N.P. (n.s.)
415 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1917).
"Hansell, supra note 27, at 284; see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 19-3, at 651 [hereinafter cited as WHITE & SUMMERS];
Shkolnick, The Nebraska Uniform Commercial Code: Article 6-Bulk Transfers, 43 NEB. L. REV.
760, 766 (1964).
3'l02 N.J. Super. 243, 245 A.2d 765 (Ch. 1968), affd, 105 N.J. Super. 511, 253 A.2d 480
(App. Div. 1969).
"Id. at 250, 245 A.2d at 769.
"Id. at 247, 245 A.2d at 768. The court cited "N.J.S. 12A: 6-104(3),'" the New Jersey
codification of UCC § 6-104(3). Id. Therefore since the defendant transferees did not have suffi-
cient notice of plaintiff creditor, they were not responsible for the inaccuracy of the transferor's
no-creditor affidavit.
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THE Two BASIC ISSUES UNDER SECTION 6-104
What kind of "knowledge" must the transferee have under section
6-104(3)? Section 1-201(25)" 4 defines "knowledge" as "actual knowl-
edge" rather than mere "notice" that exists when one has reason to
know a fact from all surrounding circumstances. Thus, as White and
Summers have concluded, even if most of the inventory had been pur-
chased by the transferor from a single supplier, the transferee has no
duty to inquire whether that supplier has been paid if his name was
omitted from the list of creditors or if the transferee received a no-
creditor affidavit,35 unless the transferee actually knows that the sup-
plier is a creditor of the transferor.0 The implication has been made"
that because the definitional cross references following section 6-104 do
not refer to section 1-201(25), yet do refer to other definitions under
section 1-201,' s the Code definition of "knowledge" as "actual knowl-
edge" might not apply. But this exclusion is only of nominal signifi-
cance; UCC experts argue that such references are not meant to be
exhaustive.3 9
Therefore those cases holding under pre-UCC bulk sales acts that
the transferee must notify all creditors of whom he should have reason
to know as well as creditors actually known and creditors listed4" seem
to be in direct conflict with section 1-201(25) by allowing "notice" to
suffice as "knowledge."
It has also been argued that section 6-104(3) might not apply to a
transfer in which a no-creditor affidavit instead of a list of creditors is
34UCC § 1-201(25) provides:
A person has "notice" of a fact when
(a) he has actual knowledge of it; or
(b) he has received a notice or notification of it;
(c) from all the facts and circumstances known to him at the time in question
he has reason to know that it exists.
A person "knows" or has "knowledge" of a fact when he has actual knowledge of
it . . .
3WHITE & SUMMERS § 19-3, at 650.
"
8As Professor Hawkland states, the very reason for section 6-104(3) is that the transferee
cannot normally know if the list of creditors is accurate. W. HAWKLAND, SALES AND BULK SALES
168 (2d ed. 1958).
-N.Y.U.C.C. § 6-101 (McKinney 1964), Practice Commentary, pt. IV, § B.
"Other definitional cross references to section 1-201 are: "Creditor," "Party," "Person,"
"Signed."
11R. SPIEDEL, R. SUMMERS & J. WHITE, COMMERCIAL TRANSAcTIONS 51 (1969).
"OSee Highway Sign & Servicing Co. v. Scott, 134 Kan. 658, 8 P.2d 391 (1932); Fitzhugh v.
Munnell, 92 Ore. 47, 179 P. 679 (1919).
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furnished,4 because a no-creditor affidavit is not a list of creditors. In
fact, several pre-UCC cases apparently accepted this argument and
carefully scrutinized the language of no-creditor affidavits to determine
whether the affidavit covered all the creditors contemplated under the
bulk sales acts. In Interstate Shirt & Collar Co. v. Windham," the
transferor's affidavit stated that the inventory was entirely free from
debt, yet the court held that the affidavit was limited to certain creditors
and thus not in compliance with the statute. Also in Romeo & Co. v.
Nassif " it was held that the transferor's affidavit that he had no credi-
tors connected with his trade was not broad enough to comprise a full
list of his creditors. Even though the above cases seem correct where a
limiting no-creditor affidavit is involved, it also appears logical to assert
that a truthful affidavit by a transferor that he absolutely has no credi-
tors is in fact a list of creditors, and even a false no-creditor affidavit is
merely a list of his creditors with all creditors' names omitted.
CONCLUSION
The UCC 4 and the New York cases" state that the Code should
be liberally construed to promote its underlying purpose and policies.
However, the language of section 6-104(3) is simple and unambiguous.
Even though Adrian Tabin gives a reasonable construction to section
6-104(3), the decision causes a drastic and undesirable change in New
York bulk sales law and uncovers a significant loophole for those trans-
ferors who wish to defraud their creditors. Furthermore, it seems likely
that no reasonable court could construe section 6-104(3) differently
from the Adrian Tabin court. Thus through section 6-104(3), the main
purpose of Article 6 can be frustrated."
Section 6-104 should be amended to place a greater burden upon
the transferee. This might be accomplished in one of two ways: first, by
requiring the transferee to take a more active part in ascertaining the
transferor's creditors, such as by requiring him to examine the trans-
feror's books or to make inquiry of the transferor as to the vendor of
the inventory; or secondly, by lowering the standard of awareness of
41N.Y.U.C.C. § 6-101 (McKinney 1964), Practice Commentary, pt. IV, § B.
42165 Mich. 648, 131 N.W. 102 (1911).
137 Ohio App. 382 (1917).
44UCC § 1-102(1).
"See Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Sharp, 56 Misc. 2d 261, 288 N.Y.S.2d 525 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
4 UCC § 6-101, Comment 2, quoted note 2 supra.
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those creditors from "knowledge" to "notice."47 The first proposal dif-
fers only slightly from the careful inquiry actions suggested by the trial
court and the dissent in Adrian Tabin. The second proposal has the
merits of being simple and easy to effectuate. Either would greatly
reduce the possibility of bulk transfers in defraud of creditors. In the
last analysis, Adrian Tabin is truly a fulfillment of the prophecy of
White and Summers that section 6-104(3) "may prove to be unwise."48
HENRY ALEXANDER EASLEY, III
Constitutional Law-The Indigent and Access to the Civil Courts
Recent decisions in state and federal courts have attempted to
define the scope of an indigent's right to obtain free access to civil
courts.' The United States Supreme Court responded to the confusion
created by several of these decisions with United States v. Kras,2 which
presented a constitutional challenge to the filing fee requirement for the
initiation of bankruptcy proceedings. The Court refused to extend its
holding in Boddie v. Connecticut3 to bankruptcy actions and rejected
the indigent petitioner's constitutional attack on mandatory filing fees.4
This decision not only upholds the constitutionality of filing fees in
bankruptcy proceedings but also provides some guidelines for determin-
ing the constitutionality of similar fees in other areas of civil litigation.
Robert W. Kras submitted his petition in bankruptcy to the United
4 See UCC § 1-201(25).
"WHITE & SUMMERS § 19-3, at 650. Before one assumes from the Adrian Tabin decision that
such a transferor consequently escapes the criminal laws and the grasp of his creditors,
two points are of noteworthy significance. First, UCC § 6-104, Comment 3, states that "the
sanction for the accuracy of the list of creditors is the criminal law of the state relative to failse
swearing. ... Second, other creditors' remedies such as attachment and execution pursuant to
judgment on other assets of the transferor are available. Furthermore, no provision in Article 6
precludes an attack on a bulk transfer as a fraudulent conveyance.
'In re Garland, 428 F.2d 1185 (1st Cir. 1970); Lee v. Habib, 424 F.2d 891, (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Bacon v. Graham, 348 F. Supp. 996 (D. Ariz. 1972); Almarez v. Carpenter, 347 F. Supp. 597 (D.
Colo. 1972); In re Smith, 341 F. Supp. 1297 (N.D. Il1. 1972); Application of Ottman, 336 F. Supp.
746 (E.D. Wis. 1972); O'Brien v. Trevethan, 336 F. Supp. 1029 (D. Conn. 1972); Robinson v.
Kaufman, 8 Cal. App. 3d 783, 87 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1970); Danforth v. State Dept. of Health and
Welfare, 303 A. 2d 794 (Maine 1973).
2409 U.S. 434 (1973).
3401 U.S. 371 (1971). The Court held filing fees in divorce actions unconstitutional as applied
to indigents.
1409 U.S. at 443-50.
[Vol. 52
ACCESS TO THE COURTS
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York.' Simultane-
ously he moved for permission to proceed with the litigation without
first satisfying the filing fee requirement," contending that his status as
an indigent required waiver of the prerequisite fee.7 He accordingly
advanced three arguments in support of his request: (1) that the federal
in forma pauperis statute' applied; (2) that the common law sanctioned
such procedure; and (3) that the filing fee as applied to indigents was a
denial of due process and equal protection? The district court rejected
the first two arguments,10 and the Supreme Court agreed." Accordingly,
this note will be limited to an analysis of the constitutional argument
advanced by the petitioner.
The district court characterized access to the judicial process as a
"fundamental right", and declared the filing fee to be a denial of equal
protection." However, on appeal by the government," the Supreme
Court reversed the lower court in a divided opinion. 4 The majority
emphasized three essential points: (1) a discharge in bankruptcy is not
a "fundamental right" subject to constitutional protection; (2) private
avenues of relief outside the judicial process were available to the peti-
tioner; and (3) the fee provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, as applied,
constituted a reasonable exercise of governmental power. 5 In rebuttal,
the dissent of Justices Brennan and Douglas stressed that a classification
51n re Kras, 331 F. Supp. 1207 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
Old.
'Id. at 1208-1I. The evidence indicated that Kras was unemployed, did not have any non-
exempt assets, and derived his only income from welfare payments. His outstanding debts
amounted to over $6,000.
128 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1970).
'409 U.S. at 439-41.
10331 F. Supp. at 1209-10. The district court decision has received analysis in the following
materials: Comment, Boddie and Beyond: Rights of the Indigent Civil Litigant, 18 CATH. LAW.
67 (1972); Comment, Access to Bankruptcy Courts for Indigents: The Extension of Boddie v.
Conn., 16 ST. Louis U.L.J. 328 (1971); Note, Bankruptcy-Filing Fees Subjected to Constitu-
tional Test, 50 N.C.L. REV. 654 (1972); Note, Bankruptcy-Filing Fees Deny Indigents' Funda-
mental Interest in Access to Courts Under Due Process and Equal Protection Guarantees, 18
WAYNE L. REv. 1431 (1972); 60 GEo. L.J. 1581 (1972).
"409 U.S. at 439-40.
12331 F. Supp. at 1210-15. The district court applied the equal protection guarantee as a part
of the fifth amendment due process requirement.
"See 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1970). The statute permits the government to appeal directly to the
Supreme Court if a statute is declared unconstitutional by a district court.
"409 U.S. at 434. The decision was five to four. Justices Blackmun, Burger, White, Powell,
and Rehenquist formed the majority, while Justices Brennan, Douglas, Stewart and Marshall
dissented.
"5409 U.S. at 444-49.
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based on wealth is inherently suspect, invoking strict judicial inspec-
tion."6 Accordingly, they reasoned that the application of the filing fee
requirement to petitioner constituted invidious discrimination which
resulted in a denial of his constitutional rights.'7
To understand the constitutional issue presented by these opposing
opinions in Kras, it is necessary to examine the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Boddie, 8 a challenge to the constitutionality of Connecticut's
mandatory filing fee in divorce actions. In Boddie the Court ruled that
the marriage relationship is an interest of "fundamental" importance'
and declared that the state could not condition the individual's access
to the sole legal means of terminating the marriage relationship on the
basis of wealth .2 The Court found that such an action by the state was
an unreasonable deprivation of liberty and therefore a denial of due
process. 2'
Even though no criminal proceedings were involved in Boddie, it
is easy to understand why the withholding of a means of divorce consti-
tuted a deprivation of liberty. The state alone has the power to terminate
a marriage, 2 and so long as an existing marriage is in effect, intimate
association with another member of the opposite sex could result in
criminal prosecution for adultery.2 Furthermore, private separation
without legal sanction provides the individual spouse with no legally
enforceable right against the other spouse with respect to the distribu-
tion of marital property24 or child custody. 25 Such consequences result
from state participation in the marriage contract and thus constitute a
deprivation of individual liberty through state action.
Faced with the possibility of such limitations on individual liberty,
a potential civil litigant is entitled to an opportunity to be heard .2 This
"Id. at 457.
'
7Id. at 458. However, Justices Stewart and Marshall felt that the decision should have been
made in the same manner as in Boddie, using the strict due process approach. They did not feel
that the case could be distinguished from Boddie, and therefore concluded that petitioner could be
afforded relief without the application of equal protection standards. Id. at 451.
18401 U.S. 371 (1971).
"Id. at 376.
2'Id. at 380-81.
211d.
2CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46-13 (Supp. 1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-5 (Supp. 1971).
2'No. 176, [1949] Conn. Pub. Acts 150 (repealed 1969); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-185 (Supp.
1971).
2
'See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46-21 (Supp. 1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3 (Supp. 197 1).
z'See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46-23, -24 (Supp. 1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-13.1 to -
13.3 (Supp. 1971).21Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971).
[Vol. 52
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right is embraced within the due process concept of fundamental fair-
ness." Therefore the majority in Boddie refused to allow a state to
condition the right to a hearing on the payment of a fee.28 In arriving
at this decision, the Court did not address the matter of inequality
among citizens seeking access to civil courts but rather stressed the
problem of inherently unfair treatment by the state of a particular indi-
vidual.
However, in concurring opinions, Justices Douglas and Brennan
expressed their belief that the filing fee requirement created inequalities
in access to divorce proceedings on the basis of wealth, and therefore,
constituted a denial of equal protection. 9 This position, which was
adopted by the district court in Kras,30 requires analysis.
Since no state action is involved in the bankruptcy proceeding, the
fourteenth amendment is not applicable. Nevertheless, the equal protec-
tion requirement has been imposed on the exercise of federal power,3
and arguably, all aspects of that guarantee are included within the fifth
amendment due process standard.32 In evaluating a statute which has
been challenged on equal protection grounds, courts normally apply
either the compelling governmental interest test33 or the rational basis
test.34
The compelling interest test is used if a fundamental right is in-
volved or if the classification effected results from the use of a suspect
category.35 Among the fundamental interests delineated by the Su-
preme Court are voting, 3 procreation, 37 interstate travel, 38 mar-
riage,39 and criminal procedures. 0 Suspect categories include race,'
27Id.
111d. at 380-81.
"Id. at 383 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 386 (Brennan, J., concurring).
"331 F. Supp. at 1211-12.
"Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
32See, e.g., cases cited in Lee v. Habib, 424 F.2d 891, 898 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
"E.g., Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512, 519-20 (1973); United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
"McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
"Cases cited note 33 supra.
-See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964).
"Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
"See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
"See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
"See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
"See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
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ancestry," alienage, 3 and poverty on a conditional basis.4
The Supreme Court has on occasion appeared to include poverty
as a category equal in importance to race. In McDonald v. Board of
Elections45 the court stated, "[A] careful examination . . . is especially
warranted where lines are drawn on the basis of wealth or race, ...
two factors which would independently render a classification highly
suspect and thereby demand a more exacting judicial scrutiny."4 Again
in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections47 the Court asserted, "[L]ines
drawn on the basis of wealth or property, like those of race . . . are
traditionally disfavored. ' 48 However, an analysis of the above cases
reveals that the Court was not only dealing with discrimination on the
basis of wealth, but also with discrimination in respect to voting rights
which the Court has considered worthy of constitutional protection as
a fundamental interest." Thus, wealth, or the lack of it, standing alone
has not been sufficient to subject a statute to the compelling governmen-
tal interest test.
This conclusion is supported by the recent decision in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez."0 In that case, the Court
upheld a Texas public school financing plan under which each school
district received funds commensurate with the tax valuation of the prop-
erty within that particular district. Holding that the plan did not violate
the equal protection clause, the Court refused to apply the compelling
state interest test since classifications based on wealth are not inherently
suspect5' and since the right to an education is not a fundamental right."2
The majority noted that the Court "has never heretofore held that
wealth discrimination alone provides an adequate basis for invoking
strict scrutiny . . . 53
"See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
13See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
"See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1124 (1969).
45394 U.S. 802 (1969).
Old. at 807.
47383 U.S. 663 (1966).
"Id. at 668.
"McDonald v. Board of Elections, 394 U.S. 802 (1968); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663 (1966); see San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. I, 29
(1973); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82
HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1124 (1968).
-411 U.S. 1 (1973).
"Id. at 28.
"Id. at 37.
mid. at 29. See also James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971), in which the Court upheld a
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Since poverty alone is not adequate to invoke the compelling inter-
est test, the district court in Kras characterized access to the courts as
a "fundamental" right. 4 Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in
Boddie stated that position as follows:
Courts are the central dispute-settling institutions in our society. They
are bound to do equal justice under law, to rich and poor alike. They
fail to perform their function in accordance with the Equal Protection
Clause if they shut their doors to indigent plaintiffs altogether ....
A state may not make its judicial processes available to some but deny
them to others simply because they cannot pay a fee.5
However, Justice Harlan's majority opinion in Boddie was specifi-
cally limited to divorce proceedings,56 and it is this limited approach to
which the Court adhered in Kras. In fact, Kras does not approach the
issue of access generally, but rather speaks to the constitutional signifi-
cance of access to a particular type of relief.57 This concept, which the
Court appears to have adopted, is aptly expressed by Professor Good-
paster.
The right of access . . . stretches across . . . a continuum of interests
from the trivial to the most significant. Aside from its general use in
the resolution of private disputes, access to the courts takes its specific
importance and coloration from the right or interest it is being used
to protect. The fundamentalness of the right of access . . . is, there-
fore, a conclusion to be drawn in the particular case. 8
Having recognized this analysis as the Court's preferred method of
approach, what then distinguishes a discharge in bankruptcy from the
dissolution of marriage such that the latter is designated "fundamental"
while the former is not? The Constitution provides that Congress may
establish uniform bankruptcy standards, but no constitutional provision
requires that a means of obtaining a discharge shall be granted. In fact
California requirement for a local referendum as a prerequisite to construction of federally funded
low-income housing. The provision had been attacked as a denial of equal protection, but the Court
found no suspect category nor fundamental right present.
11331 F. Supp. at 1213-14.
0401 U.S. at 388-89 (Brennan, J., concurring); see Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402
U.S. 954 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885).
11401 U.S. at 382-83.
11409 U.S. at 446-47.
"Goodpaster, The Integration of Equal Protection, Due Process Standards, and the Indigent's
Right of Free Access to the Courts, 56 IowA L. REv. 223, 253-54 (1970).
"U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
19731
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
except for three short periods, which together total only about fifteen
years, no such relief was available during the first one hundred years of
the republic.". Secondly, the individual has the option of private settle-
ment of his debts, and therefore he is not permanently hampered in any
of his "fundamental" associations because of the government's failure
to act. Furthermore, in contrast to the state's participation in every valid
marriage celebration," the government is not a party to the formation
of private monetary obligations from which a petitioner might seek a
discharge.
Certain problems with these distinctions are readily apparent. To
the truly indigent person, private settlement, although a theoretical al-
ternative, may be a practical impossibility. In addition, even though the
government did not participate in the formation of the debt, that obliga-
tion is good only because of the judicial processes that are available to
effect enforcement."2 Such considerations seem to be directly related to
the fundamental fairness concept.
Perhaps it is because of this relationship, which may be the essence
of the dilemma, that the Court in Kras discussed the actual possibilities
of paying the required fee. The Court stated, "[T]his much available
revenue [$1.28 per week] should be within his able-bodied reach when
the adjudication in bankruptcy has stayed collection and has brought to
a halt whatever harassment, if any, he may have sustained .... ,,13 In
view of this language, it seems plausible that the majority believed that
the filing fee requirement was fair even to the indigent. If so, this belief
may have enabled the Court to overcome the objections made above to
the points relied upon to distinguish the bankruptcy problem from the
divorce issue previously decided in Boddie.
Although no fundamental right or suspect category was deemed
present in Kras, the statute was still subject to assault on equal protec-
tion grounds, but in the context of the more lenient rational basis stan-
dard.64 Under that standard, inequalities are allowed to exist if some set
of facts will reasonably justify the law.6" The legislative intent to provide
0409 U.S. at 447.
"See C. FOOTE, R. LEVY & F. SANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAmILY LAW 170 (1966).
8409 U.S. at 455 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
"Id. at 449.
"Id. at 447-49; Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1971). In Lindsey, the court upheld conditions
on entry into court in a housing eviction case, but struck down the required double appeal bond
on the grounds that there was no rational justification for it.
"E.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
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funds for the operation of the court system was a purpose sufficient to
satisfy the rational basis test.66 This reasoning seems well based in pre-
cedent, and, accordingly, once the determination is made that the com-
pelling governmental interest test will not be applied, the indigent's
constitutional thrust is effectively parried.
In refusing to recognize access to the courts generally as a funda-
mental right, it seems apparent that the Court examined certain policy
considerations. Acceptance of the position taken by the lower court in
Kras could conceivably result in demands upon the judicial system
which would necessitate the expenditure of public funds and resources
not presently allocated. Specifically, if the indigent is guaranteed access
to the civil courts on the basis of equal protection, it follows logically
that he should receive equal access.67 Equal access might be construed
to require government provided counsel, discovery expenses, and appeal
fees. Obviously the achievement of complete equality would be difficult,
and the brand of equality actually effected might be more onerous to
the public than the present system. 8 For example, if the indigent person
received subsidized assistance, he would actually be in a better position
than the person able to bear the expense, who must base his decision
on whether to litigate by balancing his costs against his chances of
success. Such an exercise in equal protection could only result in arbi-
trary line-drawing.
Although filing fees are not a widespread problem due to the avail-
ability of in forma pauperis procedures,69 the Kras case appears to be a
clear indication that the Supreme Court does not favor the use of equal
protection reasoning as a vehicle for obtaining free access to the civil
courts. Ortwein v. Schwab,7" decided subsequent to Kras, is further
evidence of this intent. In Ortwein, the Court recognized a due process
right to a hearing prior to a reduction in welfare payments but refused
to prohibit a state from conditioning the right of appeal on the basis of
a filing fee.7' Even though the appeal in Ortwein was from an adminis-
11409 U.S. at 447-49; Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 550-55 (1949).
6TThe writer recognizes that the equal protection clause as it is presently applied does not
require absolute equality. The point made here is one resting on logic and is designed to point out
the dilemma with which the Court must cope when the controlling concept is declared to be equal
protection.
"'See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 34-35 (1956) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
"'See M'Clenahan v. Thomas, 6 N.C. 198 (1813); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-110 (Supp. 1971), 1-
112 (1969), 1-288 (Supp. 1971), 6-24 (1969), 52A-11.1 (1966).
70410 U.S. 656 (1973) (per curiam).
711d. at 659-60; see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
1973]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
trative hearing and sought initial access into the court system, the Court
reaffirmed its position that there is no constitutional right to appeal.72
Thus in determining the right of access, the Court looked not only to
the type of relief sought, but also to the stage of the judicial process
involved.73 This holding points out that the due process concept of
fairness does not necessarily lead to the far-reaching expansion which
logically follows if the standard is equality of access.
Although the Court does not seem inclined to increase the presently
delineated fundamental rights,74 it is important to consider what require-
ments may result in an area categorized as "fundamental". In the field
of criminal procedure, transcripts for appeal, 75 waiver of filing fees on
appeal,76 and court appointed counsel on appea 77 have ensued from the
application of the strict equal protection standard. Since Boddie
declared marriage a fundamental right, it seems reasonable to expect
similar developments if that decision is logically expanded. The New
York Supreme Court has already reacted in this direction. 78 Although
such expansion may be curtailed by the Supreme Court, the designation
of marriage as a fundamental interest by the Court necessarily appears
to invoke the compelling governmental interest test when dealing with
restrictions upon the exercise of divorce proceeding. Thus, it follows
that the designation of access to the civil courts as a "fundamental"
right would require application of the same stringent compelling interest
test to any judicial evaluation of procedures affecting access. Accor-
dingly, it seems reasonable to conclude that fear of the far-reaching
repercussions of the designation "fundamental" was the basic justifica-
tion for the Court's refusal to consider specifically the broad concept
of access to the civil courts.
In conclusion, certain observations can be made on the basis of
Kras. If the issue of access involves a previously delineated fundamental
right, and the civil courts provide the exclusive available remedy, the
Court will impose the due process right of an unconditional opportunity
to be heard. However, the Court appears determined to prevent the
72410 U.S. at 659-60; McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1893).
73See Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. at 659-60.
"San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodgriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973). "It is not
the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing
equal protection of the law." But cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
"Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
71Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959).
"Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
"'Vanderpool v. Vanderpool, 344 N.Y.S.2d 572 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
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introduction of the equal protection compelling interest requirements in
this area of the law and, accordingly, will not designate access to the
civil courts generally as a fundamental right.79 Such a course seems wise
to this writer. Government is not shackled with the command to achieve
the impossible goal of equality; yet the Court retains the option to
eliminate unfairness in specific areas where the burden on the indigent
is unreasonably heavy.
IRVIN WHITE HANKINS III
Employment Discrimination-Building Up the Headwinds
In 1971 the United States Supreme Court held in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.' that a private employer's hiring practices violated the man-
date of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 Faced with a showing
of racially discriminatory impact without intent,3 a unanimous Court4
concluded that "employment procedures or testing mechanisms that
operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups"5 were invalid ab-
sent proof of genuine "business necessity"' within the scope of the Title
"But see Note, Free Access to the Civil Courts as a Fundamental Constitutional Right: The
Waiving of Filing Fees for Indigents, 8 NEw ENG. REV. 275, 302 (1973). This note states the novel
proposition that since the Supreme Court did not specifically address the concept of access to the
courts generally, the designation of that concept as a fundamental right by the lower courts remains
intact.
1401 U.S. 424 (1971). The Court invalidated Duke Power's requirement of a high school
diploma and satisfactory aptitude test scores for employment in all non-labor force departments.
The requirement was instituted, without a meaningful validation study, despite the successful
performance of non-high school graduates already employed in those departments.
2Civil Rights Act of 1964 [hereinafter cited as Act], §§ 701-16, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-
15 (1970), as amended, Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to
2000e-15 (Supp. 1972). For pertinent portions of the Act see text accompanying note 18 infra. For
a recent analysis of the application of Title VII to hiring practices see Note, Employment Discrimi-
nation and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1109, 1119-51 (1971).
'An analysis of the doctrine of unintentional discrimination is not within the scope of this
note. It is now generally accepted that intent is unnecessary for the establishment of a violation of
Title VII. See, e.g., Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 991 (1971); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.) petition for cert. dismissed,
404 U.S. 1006 (1971). However, it is clear that an employment practice must have a discriminatory
impact to violate Title VII. See, e.g., Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 326 F. Supp. 198, 202-03
(S.D.N.Y. 1971). For a detailed discussion of the ramifications of the Court's redefinition of
discrimination see Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept
of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REv. 59 (1972).
'Mr. Justice Brennan did not participate.
'401 U.S. at 432.
'See notes 20-33 infra and accompanying text.
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VII Guidelines promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission.7 Subsequently, both commentators and the lower federal
courts have been primarily concerned with the ramifications of Griggs
in the area of job testing.8 Recently in Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc.,9
the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit was confronted with the
racially discriminatory impact of certain "pre-employment" standards
utilized to screen applicants prior to job testing. However, in discarding
the rigid "business necessity" doctrine in favor of a more flexible "job-
related" standard, the court presented United and other employers in
analogous positions with a windfall of considerable proportions.
In May 1969, Paul Spurlock submitted an application to United
Airlines for employment as a flight officer. At the time he was twenty-
nine years of age, had completed two years of college, and had logged
204 hours of flight time. He thus fitted the composite flight officer
qualifications previously advertised by United.'" Nevertheless, United
rejected his application because it had recently increased the educational
and flight time requirements. 1 After increasing his total flight time to
five hundred hours, Spurlock reapplied and was again rejected. Suit was
filed under the enforcement provisions of Title VII 2 alleging that the
miniscule number of black flight officers (approximately nine out of a
total of 5900) established a prima facie case of racially discriminatory
hiring practices. 3 Spurlock did not seek admission to United's "rigor-
7Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.1-.14 (1972).
'E.g., Brito v. Zia Co., 478 F.2d 1200 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v. Georgia Power Co.,
474 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1973); Wilson, A Second Look at Griggs v. Duke Power Company:
Ruminations on Job Testing, Discrimination, and the Role of the Federal Courts, 58 VA. L. REv.
844 (1972); Note, Intelligence Testing: Beyond Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 49 CiI.-KENT L.
REv. 82 (1972); Note, Employment Testing: The Aftermath of Griggs v. Duke Power Company,
72 COLUM. L. REv. 900 (1972).
'475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972).
"See Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 228, 229 (D. Colo. 1971). United's
employment brochure set forth the following qualifications: a commercial pilot's license (generally
requiring 165-200 hours of flight time), two years of college (which could be waived for applicants
with equivalent experience and excellent qualifications) and excellent physical condition. Other
factors taken into consideration included flight aptitude, learning ability and temperament. Id.
"A memorandum circulated to the personnel department in April contained the following
guidelines for placing candidates into process: "(I) College degree; (2) 500 hours of flight time
(minimum); Commercial license and instrument rating; (4) Age 21 through 29." Id. at 229.
'
2Act § 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5 (Supp. 1972).
3Sparse representation of a minority group within a workforce is a commonly accepted index
of discrimination. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805 n.19 (1973);
Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167, 1172, 1176 (2d Cir. 1972) (small percentage of black
principals in New York city schools in comparison with other large metropolitan school systems);
cf Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972) (all white
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ous training course,"14 but merely claimed denial of an equal opportun-
ity to take the tests which United administered to select candidates for
the course. Relying on a less sweeping interpretation of the Griggs
opinion, the district court held that despite the prima facie discrimina-
tory impact, United's standards clearly had a "'manifest relationship
to the employment in question.' "15 This note will examine the implica-
tions that emanate from the failure of both the trial and appellate courts
to inquire into the feasibility of less discriminatory alternatives.
Of all the recent civil rights legislation, only Title VII appears to
have been directed at the economic aspects of minority group oppres-
sion."6 To improve the employment prospects of blacks, the Act has
outlawed discrimination, generally assumed to be the cause of the prob-
lem. 7 Section 703 of Title VII states: "[I]t shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire, to
discharge any individual . . or (2) to limit, segregate or classify his
employees or applicants for employment in any way which would de-
prive . . . any individual of employment opportunities . . because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin. '"'8 Pres-
ently, Griggs is the only Supreme Court case in which testing devices
and educational requirements have been challenged as unfair hiring
practices. 9 In proscribing practices that were superficially neutral but
fire department in a city with a minority population of 6.4%). But see Allen v. City of Mobile,
466 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1972) (blacks comprised one third of city's population, but only 12.4% of
its police force). In Castro v. Beecher, 334 F. Supp. 930 (D. Mass. 1971), affd in part, rev'd in
part, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972), statistics showing 3.6% black policemen in a city with a 16.3%
black population were held to be "of no value in deciding which, if any, of the specific practices
referred to in the complaint are discriminatory . . . ." Id. at 936.
"4475 F.2d at 219.
"1330 F. Supp. 228, 235 (D. Colo. 1971), quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
432 (1971).
642 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000h (1970); see Note, 84 HARV. L. REv., supra note 2, at 1111-13.
"Note, 84 HARV. L. REV., supra note 2, at 1113. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973).
"Act § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. 2000e-2(a) (Supp.
1972) (emphasis added). The 1972 amendment added "or applicants for employment" after "his
employees."
"There have been only three other Title VII decisions on the merits. Phillips v. Martin
Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam), involved a challenge to a company rule against
hiring women with preschool-age children-men in like circumstances carried no such disability.
Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522 (1972), upheld an administrative procedure of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission concerning federal-state relations in the processing of Title
VII cases. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), upheld a rejected applicant's
right to sue subsequent to a finding by the EEOC of reasonable cause for the rejection. Further-
more, the Court held that refusal to hire an applicant because he had engaged in illegal activity
1973]
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discriminatory in operation, the Court introduced the now familiar
"business necessity" doctrine. "The touchstone is business necessity. If
an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be
shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited.""0
However, the Court's thematic approach" and its reluctance to define
precisely the concept of "business necessity" relegated the task of delin-
eating the scope of the doctrine to the lower federal courts.2 The only
assistance offered came in a casual remark that the interpretation of
Title VII contained in the EEOC Guidelines was entitled to "great
deference ' 2 3 as an expression of congressional will. 21 Under the present
Guidelines25 the use of a "test" 26 that has an adverse impact on the hiring
of minority group members constitutes a discriminatory employment
practice unless test validation2 7 demonstrates "a high degree of utility
• . . [and] alternative suitable hiring. . . procedures are unavailable for
use."28 Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's endorsement of the
Guidelines, attempts were made in early post-Griggs decisions to create
other validation standards.2 9 However, the Guidelines have recently
against the company was legitimate, absent proof of discriminatory application. Id. at 798, 806.
"'401 U.S. at 431.21This technique, often used in opening new areas of the law, involves listing several factors
which affect the Court's decision, thus allowing the lower courts to determine the proper scope of
the new rule. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961). For a
discussion of the thematic approach employed in Griggs, see Wilson, supra note 8, at 846.
1In addition to the language in the text accompanying note 20 supra, the Court elsewhere in
its opinion used such interrelated terminology as "significantly related," "genuine business need,"
and "manifest relationship." 401 U.S. at 426, 431-32.
"Id. at 434.
2
"The Commission shall have authority from time to time to issue, amend, or rescind suitable
procedures and regulations to carry out the provisions of this subchapter .... " Act § 713, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (1970). However, it is commonly accepted that the guidelines do not have
the force of law. See, e.g., Bartmess v. Drewrys U.S.A., Inc., 444 F.2d 1186, 1190 (7th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1972). An extensive discussion of the increased authority given to the
Commission by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 may be found in Comment, In
America, What You Do Is What You Are: The Equal Opportunity Employment Act of 1972, 22
CATH. U.L. REv. 455 (1973).
2The Guidelines on Employment Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1972), superseded
Guidelines on Employment Testing Procedures, 35 Fed. Reg. 1233 (1970).
2 Significantly, the Guidelines define the term "test" to include "all formal . . . techniques
of assessing job suitability including . . . background requirements [and] educational or work
history requirements .... " 29 C.F.R. § 1607.2 (1972).
nThe minimum standards for test validation are set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5 (1972). For
a recent discussion of judicial response to test validation under the EEOC Guidelines, see Note,
Application of the EEOC Guidelines to Employment Test Validation: A Uniform Standard for
Both Public and Private Employees, 41 Gao. WASH. L. REv. 505, 521-29 (1973).
-29 C.F.R. § 1607.3 (1972).
"E.g., Colbert v. H-K Corp., 4 FEP Cas. 529 (N.D. Ga. 1971), on remand from 444 F.2d
[Vol. 52
EMPLO YMENT DISCRIMINATION
gained general acceptance as the appropriate basis for resolving test
validation inquiry."0 Moreover, their influence has appeared elsewhere
as the courts have proceeded to recognize that some reasonable and
efficient employment practices, which engender widespread discrimina-
tory repercussions, are intolerable.3 1 Nonetheless, the Guidelines fail to
provide an explicit definition of the "business necessity" concept. The
most cogent judicial definition appears to be that which has evolved
from an amalgamation of the Guidelines and several appellate court
formulations:32
The test is whether there exists an overriding legitimate business
purpose such that the practice is necessary to the safe and efficient
operation of the business. Thus, the business purpose must be suffi-
ciently compelling to override any racial impact; the challenged prac-
tice must effectively carry out the business purpose it is alleged to
serve; and there must be available no acceptable alternative policies or
practices which would better accomplish the business purpose ad-
vanced, or accomplish it equally well with a lesser differential racial
impact.33
In Spurlock, the court premised its decision on the existence of a
heretofore unarticulated dual standard in Title VII litigation.
"Employment practices which are inherently discriminatory may never-
theless be valid if a business necessity can be shown. And pre-
employment qualifications which result in discrimination may be valid
if they are shown to be job-related."34 Despite the language of Title
VII, 5 the trend established by other courts 6 and forceful arguments
1381 (5th Cir. 1971). The court suggested that under Griggs "validity itself is a reasonable, not an
absolute requirement." Id. at 530.
"E.g., United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 966 (5th Cir. 1973); Moody v. Albe-
marle Paper Co., 474 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1973).
3'This view has frequently been taken in cases involving seniority systems having discrimina-
tory impacts on black employees. See, e.g., United States v. Hayes Int'l. Corp., 456 F.2d 112 (5th
Cir. 1972); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971), noted in 50 N.C.L. REv.
1161 (1972).
310ne of the formulations happened to be that announced by the Tenth Circuit in Jones v.
Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 249 (10th Cir. 1970): "When a policy is demonstrated
to have discriminatory effects, it can be justified only by a showing that it is necessary to the safe
and efficient operation of the business." (emphasis added).
"Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (footnotes omitted). See also United States
v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418, 451 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972)
(management convenience not synonymous with business necessity).
31475 F.2d at 218 (emphasis added).
35See text accompanying note 18 supra.
3 See, e.g., cases cited notes 3 & 30 supra. Also, in Johnson v. Pike Corp., 332 F. Supp. 490
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by commentators,3 7 United's requirements were analyzed within a job-
related context.38
The court first concluded that United's statistical evidence clearly
showed that "500 hours was a reasonable minimum to require of appli-
cants to insure their ability to pass United's training program."3 Since
minimizing the program's cost constituted a "business necessity," the
standard was job-related." Superimposing the "business necessity" title
upon a "job-related" analysis appears only to expose and exacerbate the
latter's vulnerability to careful scrutiny. Even under its own relatively
primitive formulation of "business necessity," the court had required
proof that the policy was "essential to the safe, efficient operation of
the company's business."41 Moreover, simple statistical analysis reveals
that a lower cut-off point would be an equally reasonable alternative.4"
The court's position can be defended however, by recourse to quantita-
tive economic values. A higher cut-off point causes a proportionate
reduction in total expenditures by reducing the number of trainees nec-
essary to produce a given number of pilots.43 But there is a readily
discernable flaw that militates against complete reliance on this argu-
ment. Rejection of the lowest trainee groups not only eliminates half of
the failures, but also depletes the ranks of graduates by approximately
one-third. Consequently, as more applicants from the higher categories
are hired, the proportionate increase in failures from this group will
partially offset the reduction achieved by elimination of the lower appli-
cant groups.
(C.D. Cal. 1971), the court read Griggs to say that the only permissible factors to consider in
refusing to hire an employee were those directly affecting his ability to perform his job. Thus even
the job relatedness approach "leaves no room for arguments regarding inconvenience, annoyance
or even expense to the employer." Id. at 495.
'7See Wilson, supra note 8, at 873 (academic records held to same standards as employment
tests); Note, 84 HARV. L. REv., supra note 2, at 1142.
3'The court itself had previously recognized the hierarchy in standards. See Jones v. Lee Way
Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 249 (10th Cir. 1970).
3"475 F.2d at 216, 218-19 & n.l.
1"Id. at 219.
"Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 250 (10th Cir. 1970).
"The statistical significance of a difference between two groups can be determined using the
chi-square test of significance. In this case the null hypothesis is that the success rate is the same
for the two groups of trainees above and below a given cutoff point. Using both two hundred and
five hundred hours of flight time as cutoff points to be tested, the null hypothesis will be rejected
in both instances (at less than the .05% level) since the one percent and five percent levels are
commonly used in deciding whether to reject a null hypothesis. Thus the two cut off points appear
to be of equal statistical significance. See G.W. SNEDECOR & W. G. COCHRAN, STATISTICAL
METHoDs 20-29, 215-19 (6th ed. 1968).
'475 F.2d at 219 n.l.
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With respect to the increased eduational requirement, the court
noted that "possession of a college degree indicated that the applicant
had the ability to understand and retain concepts and information given
in the atmosphere of a classroom training program."44 No inquiry was
made into the comparative value of the company's admission tests for
revealing the desired traits. Furthermore, the degree requirement was
apparently not considered dispositive since United willingly waived it
for applicants whd possessed extensive, high quality flight experience."
In reflecting on the purposes of Title VII, the Supreme Court in
Griggs took explicit judicial notice of the disparity between the educa-
tional levels of blacks and whites as being a consequence "directly trace-
able to race."4 Nevertheless, some courts have simply assumed that the
high school diploma requirement is valid.47 As one commentator has
noted:
The reluctance of courts to tamper with such requirements is
understandable, given the faith that American society has always re-
posed in education. But it ignores the substantial discriminatory im-
pact which educational requirements can have, without justification,
on minority group employment."
Today the disparity continues; it is even greater at the college level.49
The rate of black unemployment persists at double the rate for whites.5"
Recently, some courts, relying on these facts as well as Chief Justice
Burger's admonition against "using diplomas or degrees as fixed mea-
sures of capability," 5' have employed various formulations of the "busi-
ness necessity" concept to invalidate the high school diploma require-
ment. 2 By circumventing the strictures of this doctrine, the Tenth Cir-
"lid. at 219.
45Id.
11401 U.S. at 430. See the statistics used by the Court. Id. at 430 n.6.
"Broussard v. Schlumberger Well Services, 315 F. Supp. 506, 510 (S.D. Tex. 1970); Dobbins
v. Electrical Workers Local 212, 292 F. Supp. 413, 437-38 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
"Note, 84 HARV. L. REv., supra note 2, at 1143.
"Negroes comprise 11.2% of the total population, but only 6.0% of the total college enroll-
ment. 11.6% of whites over age twenty-five complete four years or more of college, compared with
4.5% of Negroes. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES 1971 27, 108, 128 (92d ed. 1971).
*,See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW 104
(Aug. 1973).
11401 U.S. at 433.
2See United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973); Carter v. Gallagher,
452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972). However, the high school diploma
or its equivalent has survived rigid scrutiny as a requirement for metropolitan policemen. See, e.g.,
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cuit easily approved United's college degree requirement, since "a per-
son with a college degree is more able to cope with the initial training
program and the unending series of refresher courses than a person
without a college degree.""3 However, Spurlock fails to require the
presentation of any empirical evidence to substantiate the proposition
that a college graduate can better cope with the program than a non-
graduate of comparable intelligence. But the court apparently saw no
need for comparisons and consequently, did not even demand evidence
of a significant correlation between college graduation and successful
performance as a pilot, given the fact that an applicant had passed the
training program.
In conclusion, the court offered an explanation for the relative
lightness of United's burden of proof: the job of airline flight officer
"clearly requires a high degree of skill and the economic and human
risks involved in hiring an unqualified applicant are great. . . ."4 In
light of the facts in the case, this crucial syllogism appears to rest on
somewhat dubious logic at best. The court's description of the chal-
lenged requirements as "pre-employment" qualifications implicitly rec-
ognizes that they merely serve to determine which applicants may pro-
ceed to admissions testing.55 As the trial court noted, the plaintiff was
not demanding automatic employment because of his race, merely the
opportunity to take the tests." Assuming the training program was as
effective as the court's use of the term "rigorous" implies, only those
genuinely capable individuals would eventually become pilots. Thus the
"staggering" human and economic risks cited by the court57 appear to
involve merely those losses incurred because of applicants who enter but
fail to complete the training program. In light of the comparatively
diminutive "human" risk involved, the court's reasoning would seem
inappropriate unless United were able to demonstrate a "staggering"
economic risk involved in accepting less qualified applicants into its
training program.
Assuming arguendo the validity of the court's proposition, its con-
Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (lst Cir. 1972) (given two methods of adequate screening, the non-
discriminatory one must be used), cited with approval in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 802 n.14 (1973).
11475 F.2d at 219.
"Id.
-"See id. at 218.
"Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 228, 235 (D. Colo. 1971).
"See 475 F.2d at 219.
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clusion nevertheless remains vulnerable unless one accepts the propriety
of "selective extraction" as a means of legitimizing decisions. The court
appears guilty of this convenient practice upon examination of the
source of its proposition." The court's justification was extracted from
that portion of the Guidelines concerned with minimum standards for
validation of tests. 9 In effect, the court implicitly equated United's
requirements with tests in order to rationalize the application of a low-
ered evaluation standard, yet it completely ignored a preceding section
that enumerated additional criteria by which tests must be evaluated."
Had the court extended this tacit analogy to its logical dimensions,
United would have been required to show that suitable alternative hiring
procedures were "unavailable for its use.""1 Moreover, the court failed
to articulate reasons for ignoring the Guidelines' definition of the term
",test. 62
In defense of the court's conservative interpretation of Griggs, it
should be noted that Spurlock contains at least two substantial factual
variants. First, Griggs involved an archetype of the subordination of
black laborers in the South. 3 Obviously the circumstances in Spurlock
revolve on a more sophisticated level concomitant with the advanced
technology involved in United's business. Also, Duke Power had imple-
mented its requirements without a prior meaningful study of their rela-
tionship to successful job performance. 4 United, on the other hand, at
least offered statistical evidence to demonstrate "good faith"65 in raising
its requirements. These two factors perhaps prompted the trial court's
reiteration of Chief Justice Burger's caveat that Congress did not "com-
mand that any person be hired simply because. . . he is a member of
a minority group"66 nor that "the less qualified be preferred over the
"Id.
"'See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5 (1972). The court drew its justification statement from 29 C.F.R.
§ 1607.5(c)(2)(iii) (1972).
"See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3 (1972).
6129 C.F.R. § 1607.3(b) (1972). See text accompanying note 28 supra.
"
2See note 26 supra.
OSee 401 U.S. at 426-28.
'lid. at 431.
651n Handverger v. Harvill, 479 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1973), good faith was held to be a valid
defense to an allegation of deprivation of rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). But cf Johnson
v. Pike Corp., 332 F. Supp. 490, (C.D. Cal. 1971) (good faith employment policy with discrimina-
tory consequences interdicted by Title VII).
6401 U.S. at 430-31, quoted with approval in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 800 (1973).
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better qualified simply because of minority origins.""1
The Spurlock decision qualifies as an important precedent for a
sympathetic lower court response to the Burger Court's cautious ap-
proach toward enforcement of the constitutional rights of minorities. 8
Had the court seen fit to apply either a "business necessity" approach
or the standards provided by the EEOC Guidelines, United's task would
have been measurably greater. If the goals of Title VII are not to be
abandoned, the courts must carefully consider the availability of alter-
natives and the specific problems they themselves present, and weigh
these against the inequity of current hiring practices. If less discrimina-
tory alternatives are feasible the courts should be extremely reluctant
to condone existing discriminatory impacts. The "headwinds" against
minorities have not yet dissipated; the advanced technology and elevated
production standards of modern corporations should not blind the
courts to the portentous consequences of permitting employers to reject
qualified minority applicants merely because their white applicants are
"better" qualified.
SAXBY M. CHAPLIN
Estate Tax-Administrative Expense Deductions-
A Reaffirmation of the Section 2053(a)
Standard
The transfer of property at death results in the levy of federal estate
taxes upon the taxable estate, that is, the gross estate less allowable
deductions and exemptions.' One of the allowable deductions from the
gross estate is that of administration expenses provided for in section
2053(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.2 Treasury Regulations
6401 U.S. at 436.
"See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2051.
21NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2053(a) provides:
General Rule.-For purposes of the tax imposed by section 2001, the value of the
taxable estate shall be determined by deducting from the value of the gross estate such
amounts-
(1) for funeral expenses,
(2) for administration expenses,
(3) for claims against the estate, and
(4) for unpaid mortages on, or any indebtedness
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sections 20.2053-3(a)3 and 20.2053-3(d)(2)4 limit the deduction for ex-
penses associated with the sale of property to situations where the sale
was necessary to preserve the estate, pay debts of the estate, or to effect
distribution. However, in Estate of Park v. Commissioner,5 the Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected the necessity requirement im-
posed by these regulations to the extent that they apply to the sale of
probate property and held that the exclusive criterion for deductibility
under section 2053(a)6 should be the determination provided for in the
statute itself-the allowability under the laws of the jurisdiction in which
the estate is being administered. 7
Mabel F. Colton Park's will was admitted to probate on March 8,
1968. Her probate estate8 included a residence and a cottage that were
to pass to her four sons under the residuary clause of the will, a situation
which the Tax Court conceded might prove administratively inconven-
in respect of, property where the value of the decedent's interest therein, undiminished
by such mortgage or indebtedness, is included in the value of the gross estate . . . as
are allowable by the laws of the jurisdiction, whether within or without the United
States, under which the estate is being administered.
3Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(a) (1958) provides:
In general. The amounts deductible from a decedent's gross estate as "administra-
tion expenses" of the first category (see paragraphs (a) and (c) of § 20.2053-I) are
limited to such expenses as are actually and necessarily incurred in the administration
of the decedent's estate; that is, in the collection of assets, payment of debts, and
distribution of property to the persons entitled to it. The expenses contemplated in the
law are such only as attend the settlement of an estate and the transfer of the property
of the estate to individual beneficiaries or to a trustee, whether the trustee is the executor
or some other person. Expenditures not essential to the proper settlement of the estate,
but incurred for the individual benefit of the heirs, legatees, or devisees, may not be taken
as deductions. Administration expenses include (1) executor's commissions; (2) attor-
ney's fees; and (3) miscellaneous expenses. Each of these classes is considered separately
in paragraphs (b) through (d) of this section.
'Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(d)(2) (1958) provides in part:
Expenses for selling property of the estate are deductible if the sale is necessary in
order to pay the decedent's debts, expenses of administration, or taxes, to preserve the
estate, or to effect distribution. The phrase "expenses for selling property" includes
brokerage fees and other expenses attending the sale, such as the fees of an auctioneer
if it is reasonably necessary to employ one.
5475 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1973).
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2053(a), quoted in note 2 supra.
7475 F.2d at 676.
'The probate estate consisted of the following:
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ient.9 The sons decided that they would prefer the readily divisible cash
proceeds from a sale of the real estate and therefore requested the
administrator to sell the properties under the power given him in the
will. Brokerage fees and other expenses incurred in selling the property
were included in the administrative expenses listed in the annual probate
accountings and were approved for deduction from the principal of the
estate by the Michigan probate court. However, the Commissioner sub-
sequently disallowed the estate tax deduction for these expenses.
The Tax Court affirmed the Commissioner's decision on the basis
of the requirement of the regulations that the sale and related expenses
be necessarily incurred in administration of the decedent's estate rather
than for the individual benefit of the devisees.1 ° The court concluded that
the sale of the property was not essential for the proper settlement of
the estate, and therefore no deduction for the selling expenses should be
allowed."
The Sixth Circuit reversed. The court first examined an earlier Tax
Court decision, Estate of David Smith.12 The issue in Smith was the
deductibility of expenses incurred when the decedent's sculptures were
sold in order to fund certain trusts established for his daughters. The
majority of the Tax Court held that the fact that expenses had been
allowed by the probate court was not sufficient for federal estate tax
Residence S 52,000.00
Cottage 24,750.00
U.S. Savings Bonds, Series E 24,069.62
350 Shares Continental Associates, Inc. common stock 350.00
Cash in bank account 1,807.45
Social Security benefit 97.90
Income on hand and accrued due
deceased's estate from Trust
Accounts 6,625.55
Household furniture at 253 Lewistion Road 5,841.25
Household furniture and personal effects
at 2315 Lake Shore Road 250.00
Jewelry 2,090.75
Refund of overpayment of 1967
Federal income tax 347.61
Proceeds from Connecticut General
annuity policy 5,004.38
$123,234.51
'Estate of Mabel F. Colton Park, 57 T.C. 705, 710 (1972).
irTreas. Reg. §§ 20.2053-3(a), 20.2053-3(d)(2) (1958), quoted in notes 3-4 supra.
1157 T.C. at 709.
1257 T.C. 650 (1972).
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deductibility without also meeting the criteria set forth in Regulation
section 20.2053-3(d)(2).13 The court felt that the standard contained in
the statute was only a threshold requirement with the ultimate test being
satisfaction of the regulations' necessity requirement."
Estate of Park found the reasoning in Smith unpersuasive."1 The
court reasoned that if the fiduciary, on the basis of his sound judgment,
as approved by the probate court, feels that the estate would benefit by
the sale of the real estate, a section 2053(a) deduction should not be
denied because the Commissioner does not think the sale was
necessary." Instead the Park court advocated a strict application of
section 2053(a) of the Code, 7 which requires only that the deduction be
allowable under state law.'"
It has long been established that deductions from federal tax liabil-
ity are questions of federal law, and are allowed only when clearly
provided in the appropriate statute." Estate of Park does not dispute
this, for it is precisely the standard for deductibility contained in section
2053(a) that the court feels called upon to defend. What the Sixth
Circuit has rejected is the Treasury's interpretation of the statute which
relegates the statutory standard of deductibility to a role preliminary to
the Treasury's own necessity standard.
Regulations sections 20.2053-3(a) and 20.2053-3(d)(2) have been in
effect in substantially identical language since 1919.11 Treasury regula-
tions and interpretations long continued without substantial change are
usually deemed to have received congressional approval, and hence have
the effect of being law.2' However, the rejection of these regulations by
the Sixth Circuit does not seem offensive to the deference usually given
"Id. at 661.
141d.
"1475 F.2d at 676.
|51d.
"While the literal wording of § 2053(a) refers to deductions "allowable" in the various juris-
dictions, the holding of Estate of Park limits deductibility to situations where the deduction actually
has been allowed by a state probate court. 475 F.2d at 676. The restriction represents the proper
application of § 2053(a). The propriety of a deduction depends upon the circumstances of the
administration of the particular estate. Accordingly, it would be unreasonable in applying
§ 2053(a) to a specific estate to speak of the allowability of a deduction without reference to
whether the deduction had been allowed or would likely be allowed if reviewed by the probate court.
"475 F.2d at 676.
"Deputy v. Dupont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435
(1934).
"Estate of David Smith, 57 T.C. 650, 664 (1972).
"United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 305-06 (1967); Taft v. Commissioner, 304 U.S. 351,
357 (1938).
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long-standing regulations. The Supreme Court has previously ques-
tioned the significance of reenactment without expressed approval of the
prior interpretations."2 Furthermore, the disputed regulations were not
mentioned in the pertinent section of the House Report on the adoption
of section 2053Y.2 The only discussion in the report was of the state law
standard of deductibility.24 Therefore, it is a plausible argument that
Congress has considered and approved only that standard.
Estate of Park's defense of the state determination of deductibility
draws support from a number of judicial opinions outside the Sixth
Circuit which have questioned the propriety of the standard of the regu-
lations."5 In Estate of Louis Sternberger28 an executor was instructed
2Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
2H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1954) provides:
G. Expenses, indebtedness, and taxes (sec. 2053)
Funeral expenses, administration expenses, claims against the estate and unpaid mort-
gages are deductible in computing the taxable estate under present law. However, this
deduction is limited to those expenses allowable by the laws of the jurisdiction under
which the estate is being administered and cannot exceed the value of the property
included in the gross estate subject to claims, that is, the probate estate. Thus, if the
decedent has placed most of his assets in a trust (not includible in his probate estate)
funeral and other expenses actually paid . . . out of the trust assets are not allowed as
a deduction to the extent they exceed the value of the property in the probate estate.
These arbitrary distinctions have been removed under your committee's bill. Expen-
ses incurred in connection with property subjected to the estate tax, although not in the
probate estate, are to be allowed as deductions if the expenses are of the type which
would be allowed as deductions if the property were in the probate estate and they are
actually paid within 1 year of the decedent's death.
In addition, expenses in connection with property subject to claims are to be allowed
without regard to the total value of the probate estate if they are paid within the period
provided for the assessment of the estate tax.
(emphasis added.)
241d.
2With the exception of Smith, prior determinations within the Sixth Circuit failed to establish
a clear preference for either the necessity requirement of the regulations, or the exclusive state
determination of deductibility. In Estate of Goodwin v. Commissioner, 201 F.2d 576 (6th Cir.
1953), a probate court in Ohio had determined that the daughters' claim against the estate qualified
for a § 2053(a) deduction. Despite the Commissioner's accusation that such was for the individual
benefit of the daughters rather than the estate as a whole, the Sixth Circuit allowed the deduction.
The allowance was reconciled with the regulations by reliance upon Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.30, 7
Fed. Reg. 1449 (1942), the predecessor of Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-1(b)(2), see note 41 infra.
In Union Commerce Bank v. Commissioner, 339 F.2d 163 (6th Cir. 1964), a deduction for
interest on overdue debts not provided for in Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(a) was remanded for further
examination. However, there had not been a determination as to its deductibility by a probate
court.
The court in Central Trust Co. v. Welch, 304 F.2d 163 (6th Cir. 1962) allowed deduction of
attorney fees incurred in defending an estate. Reliance on the deference given probate court
determinations under Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-1(b)(2), see note 41 infra, excused the court from
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under the decedent's will that he might sell the decedent's residence if
the surviving wife and daughter decided not to live there. The executor
subsequently sold the property and claimed a section 2053(a) adminis-
trative expense deduction for the related brokerage fee and legal expen-
ses. The court rejected the government's argument that the expense was
one of the trust created by the decedent rather than of his estate. Al-
though the New York Surrogate's Court found that the proceeds from
the sale were not needed to pay any debt of the estate,21 the court
allowed the deduction since the selling expenses were administration
expenses allowed by the laws of New York. 8
In Ballance v. United States,29 the Commissioner had rejected a
deduction under the predecessor of section 2053(a) allowable under Illi-
nois law for interest that accrued to debts of the estate when the fidu-
ciary delayed payment of the debts to avoid selling assets at a loss. The
Seventh Circuit refused to grant the regulations superiority to the stan-
dard contained in the statute and allowed the deduction. 30
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Commercial Na-
tional Bank v. United States,"' considered the deductibility of attor-
neys' fees included in the settlement of an heir's challenge to the dece-
dent's will. Since the assignment of costs was not petitioned for in the
probate court, it had not been declared as an administration expense
under North Carolina law and the deduction was not allowed.32 How-
ever, the court theorized that if that assignment of costs to the estate
had taken place according to the appropriate provision in the North
deciding the validity of § 20.2053-3(d)(2).
The Tax Court in Estate of Swayne, 43 T.C. 190 (1964), considered the deductibility under
§ 2053(a) of the selling expenses incurred when the decedent's son as executor sold the decedent's
residence. The sale had been authorized by the probate court but the deduction was denied for
failure to establish the necessity of the sale in accordance with § 20.2053-3(a). However, the
taxpayer had not challenged the validity of the regulation itself; he had relied solely on an assertion
that such sale was necessary.
2818 T.C. 836 (1952), affd, 207 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1953), rev'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 187
(1955). The issue of deductibility was not raised on appeal.
2Id. at 842.
28d.
2347 F.2d 419 (7th Cir. 1965).
0"[T]he definition of 'administration expenses' in the treasury regulation as .... 'necessar-
ily' incurred in the administration of the estate cannot serve to override the statutory provision
• . . authorizing the deduction of '[s]uch amounts . . . for administration expenses . . . as are
allowed by the laws of the jurisdiction . . . . under which the estate is being administered.'" Id.
at 423.
31196 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1952).
12Id. at 184.
19731
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Carolina General Statutes,33 the determination of the probate court
might have been controlling for the question of federal estate tax deduct-
ibility.34
Estate of Park does not seem to be a radical departure from preced-
ent. Rather, it makes explicit the dissatisfaction with the regulations
that was suggested in these earlier cases. Section 20.2053-3(a) pits the
interests of the estate as a whole against the interest of the individual
beneficiaries: "The expenses contemplated in law are such only as at-
tend the settlement of an estate. . . .Expenditures not essential to the
proper settlement of the estate, but incurred for the individual benefit
of the heirs . . . may not be taken as deductions."3 The statement is
internally inconsistent, for what benefits the estate as a whole also
benefits the heirs of that estate. Where there is only one beneficiary,
by necessity, there must be a one to one correlation between the benefit
enjoyed by the estate and that enjoyed by the individual beneficiary.
Of greater importance to the court in Estate of Park, however, were
the pragmatic considerations for the estate administrator. The Sixth
Circuit has realized that a fiduciary functions as the agent of the benefi-
ciaries as well as of the decedent.3 7 The fiduciary has a duty to protect
the assets of the estate. 8 This duty may require the selling of some
unproductive assets in order that the income producing assets will not
have to be sacrificed to meet the financial obligations of the estate.
Similarly, if the executor sees an opportunity to sell an asset at a sub-
stantial gain over its present value, or if he foresees a devaluation of the
33N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-21 (1969), which is similar in pertinent part to the statute before the
court, provides that "Costs in the following matters shall be taxed against either party, or appor-
tioned among the parties, in the discretion of the court:. . .(2) Caveats to wills. . . ."The statute
further provides that "[T]he word 'costs' as the same appears and is used in this section shall be
construed to include reasonable attorneys' fees in such amounts as the court shall in its discretion
determine and allow . ..."
"Notwithstanding this established state law, the United States contends that the
attorneys' fees were not administrative expenses within the terms of the federal statute
: * .and that therefore even if they had been assessed as costs of the proceeding by the
judgment of the state court, they were not deductible for the purposes of the estate tax.
This position is doubtful since it would seem to have been the purpose of Congress to
follow the state law in the allowance for administrative expenses, but we do not find it
necessary to decide that question in this case.
196 F.2d at 185.
3Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(a) (1958), quoted in note 3 supra.
3 Sussman v. United States, 236 F. Supp. 507, 509 (E.D.N.Y. 1962); see Estate of Harry C.
Porter, 49 T.C. 207 (1967).
-1475 F.2d at 676.
"'First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 233 F. Supp. 19, 29 (D. Kan. 1964).
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asset during the period of probate, he would be preserving the aggregate
asset value of the estate if he sells now, even though the sale was not
"necessarily" incurred in the sense that it was not needed to provide
funds to pay liens upon the estate. The sale of non-income producing
residential property will "preserve" the aggregate assets of the estate in
two ways. First, liquid assets which are not used in satisfaction of the
liens of the estate are able to be invested in income producing ventures.
Secondly, the maintenance cost of the residential property would con-
tinue to be a drain on the assets of the estate as long as the property is
held.
Aside from the purely economic considerations which render the
regulations' standard overly restrictive, there is a basic convenience
consideration. In Estate of Park there were two properties and four
sons. It is usually inconvenient for the administrator to make such a
division. 9 Such practical considerations are not recognized in the ne-
cessity requirement of the regulations. The decision in Estate of Park
returns the standard to one more in harmony with the realities of the
daily administration of estates.
If Estate of Park represents the proper standard for section 2053(a)
deductions, the prudent fiduciary would be wise to consider what vary-
ing fact situations might fit under its fiscal umbrella as administrative
expenses. Three areas, expenses incurred in will contests, appraisal
costs, and probate of an intestate's estate, should exemplify the consid-
erations and questions that would arise with any attempt to extend the
Estate of Park rationale to different fact situations.
In the past, the question of the deductibility of expenses incurred
in a will contest has defied any definitive determination. Some courts
have relied heavily on the probate court's determination 0 and the defer-
ence given this determination by the Treasury Regulation section
20.2053-1(b)(2).4 Others have required the will contest to meet the ne-
cessity requirement of Regulation section 20.2053-3(a).42 Under Estate
3"See Estate of Mabel F. Colton Park, 57 T.C. 705, 710 (1972).
'"E.g., Sussman v. United States, 236 F. Supp. 507 (E.D.N.Y. 1962).
"E.g., Estate of Goodwin v. Commissioner, 201 F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 1953); Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2053-1(b)(2) (1958) provides in part: "Effect of court decree. The decision of a local court as
to the amount and allowability under local law of a claim or administration expense will ordinarily
be accepted if the court passes upon the facts upon which deductibility depends." (emphasis added.)
"In Estate of Louvine M. Baldwin, 59 T.C. 654 (1973), the court denied a § 2053(a) deduction
for the legal expenses of the sole surviving heir's attempt to enter caveats to the will of her mother.
The court conceded that state law controlled as to what was a proper administrative expense, but
followed the regulations in holding that the expenses incurred in reaching a settlement were for
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of Park, the only question as to deductibility of such expense would be
its status under Michigan law.43 The applicable statute provides that the
court may charge reasonable expenses incurred by the fiduciary in
defense of the will.44 Since such expense would be readily admitted as
necessary in the administration of the estate, Estate of Park would
provide no additional area of deductibility for will contests in Michigan.
North Carolina, in contrast, is a jurisdiction where the Estate of
Park decision could provide a significant additional estate tax deduction
for will contest costs. The North Carolina statute provides that costs,
including reasonable attorneys' fees, may be taxed against either party
or apportioned among the parties in the discretion of the court.45 By
taxing the contestant's costs to the estate as an administrative expense,
a friendly probate court could minimize the potential loss of both the
contesting beneficiary and the net estate. In Commercial Bank, the
Fourth Circuit dealt with this situation in dicta. The court found the
government's contention that the costs of the will contest would not be
deductible even if they had been assessed against the estate as costs of
the proceeding to be "doubtful."4 If Estate of Park controlled in North
Carolina, the government position would be less than doubtful; it would
be futile.47
the individual benefit of the heir rather than the estate as a whole, and therefore not deductible as
a necessary administrative expense.
Similarly, a § 2053(a) deduction was not available in Jacobs v. United States, 248 F. Supp.
695 (E.D. Tex. 1965), for attorney's fees incurred by the claimant trying to get the whole estate
for himself. Again, failure to meet the necessity requirement of Regulation § 20.2053-3, in that
the expense was for the individual benefit of the claimant rather than the estate, precluded a
§ 2053(a) deduction.
However, there had not been a state court determination of deductibility in either of these
cases. In Baldwin, the question of the deductibility of attorney fees for the daughter was not raised
in the probate proceeding, and in Jacobs, the will had not been submitted to probate. If Estate of
Park is limited to the situation where there actually has been a determination of deductibility by
the probate court, the IRS would not have to adjust its approach to cases which fit the procedural
context of Baldwin and Jacobs.
4 See note 2 supra.
"MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178(94) (1962).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-21 (1969), quoted in note 33 supra.
"Commercial Nat'l Bank v. United States, 196 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1952).
"The Commissioner could argue along the lines of Commissioner v. Bosch, 387 U.S. 456
(1967), that a determination of a state tribunal is not binding on a federal court, unless it is a
determination of the highest court of that state. However, the language of Bosch distinguishes that
case from a § 2053(a) situation:
Next, it must be remembered that it was a federal taxing statute that Congress enacted
and upon which we are here passing. Therefore, in construing it, we must look to the
legislative history surrounding it. We find the report of the Senate Finance Committee
ESTATE TAX
Estate of Park may pose a problem in those instances where an
expense must be incurred for tax purposes which is unnecessary for
settlement of the estate under local probate procedures. A common
expense of this type is appraisal costs. Typically, state law requires a
valuation for estate inventory purposes which is obtained quickly and
and often perfunctorily by a court appointed appraiser. The appointed
appraiser often has no expertise in valuing the property and is awarded
a relatively low fee by the court. If commercial real estate, closely held
securities, antiques, works of art or other similar items are involved, the
executor may require the services of several qualified appraisers to ob-
tain valuations for federal estate tax purposes. The fees of the appraisers
may be many times the amount allowable under state law for court
appointed appraisers. If Estate of Park means to limit the deduction to
that allowable (and allowed) by the local court, the result will be that
significant and required costs of settling an estate may not be deductible.
Had Mabel Colton Park died intestate, the applicable Michigan
statute would allow a section 2053(a) deduction. The sale of intestate
recommending enactment of the marital deduction used very guarded language in refer-
ring to the very question involved here. It said that "proper regard" not finality, should
be given to "interpretations of the will" by state courts and then "only when entered by
a court in a bona fide adversary proceeding . . . .If Congress had intended state trial
determination to have that effect on the federal actions, it certainly would have said so
Id. at 463-64 (emphasis added.) The relevant part of the House Report on the reenactment of
§ 2053, see note 23 supra, contained no such restrictive language. Instead it mentioned only the
state court's determination as the basis for deductibility.
4 MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178(462) (1962) provides:
Sale of real estate of decedent; when may be authorized . . . duty of fiduciary. SEC. 2.
Real estate of a deceased person, or any interest therein, may be sold upon petition of
the executor or administrator under license of the probate court in the following cases.
I. When it shall appear to the court that the personal estate of a deceased person
in the hands of his executor or administrator is insufficient to pay the debts of the
deceased and the charges of administering his estate, or whenever it shall appear to the
court that it is for the best interest of all persons interested in the estate that his real
estate or some part thereof be sold for such purpose in lieu of disposing of the personal
estate;
2. When it shall appear to the court that sale of such real estate is necessary to
preserve the estate or to prevent a sacrifice thereof, or to carry out the provision of a
will;
3. When a testator shall have given any legacy by will that is effectual to pass or
charge real estate, and his personal property is insufficient to pay such legacy, together
with his debts and charges of administration;
4. When a testator shall have given real estate to two [2] or more persons, or when
a person shall have died intestate, and it shall appear to the court that it is necessary or
will be for the best interests of the persons interested in said real estate as such . ..
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property, necessarily approved by the probate judge,49 would receive the
Estate of Park endorsement as fiduciary discretion exercised with ap-
proval of the probate court. This gives a tax advantage to the heirs if
the land is sold for their benefit while still under the fiduciary's adminis-
tration.
In contrast, the administrator of an intestate's estate in North
Carolina does not have the discretionary power to sell real estate. Real
estate may be sold only when the outstanding debts of the decedent's
estate require such a sale.5 Thus it appears that Estate of Park would
have no significant impact upon the asset management considerations
of an administrator of an intestate's estate in North Carolina.
CONCLUSION
In proclaiming the standard for a section 2053(a) administration
expense deduction to be the good conscience of "the fiduciary on the
basis of his sound judgment, as approved by the probate court ... .,"I
Estate of Park could cause the federal government to lose considerable
revenue under the decisions of state tribunals that do not have the
Treasury's concern for tax revenues at heart. However, the size of the
federal government's coffers should have no bearing on the validity of
section 20.2053-3(d)(2). In its zeal to protect the general policy that
heirs to sell the samefor purpose of distribution: Provided, That [sic] application under
this subdivision shall be approved in writing by the persons owning a majority interest
of the real estate proposed to be sold ....
(emphasis added.)
"'MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178(475) (1962) provides:
Order for sale, conveyance or lease; when judge to make. SEc. 15. If the judge of probate
shall be satisfied, after a full hearing upon the petition, and an examination of the proofs
and allegations of the parties interested, that a sale, transfer, conveyance or lease...
be assented to by all persons interested, he shall thereupon make an order of sale,
authorizing the fiduciary to sell, transfer, convey, or lease the whole, or so much and
such part of the real estate, interest therein, or easement, described in the petition as he
shall judge necessary or beneficial.
ON.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-81 (1966).
"Id.; But see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-96 (1966) which provides that in a testate situation, an
executor may be provided with a discretionary power of sale. If Estate of Park controlled in North
Carolina, a significant anomaly would result. Not only could discretionary sale for the benefit of
the beneficiaries not allowable in the intestate situation be made under a power given the executor
in the will, but also the related expenses could potentially qualify for a § 2053(a) deduction. This
variance is conducive to a friendly executor and friendly probate court allowing tile beneficiaries
to realize a tax break on the sale of unwanted property while it is still in probate.
5475 F.2d at 676.
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wealth should not be transferred at death tax free,53 the Treasury's
necessity requirement goes beyond any standard suggested by Congress.
The rejection of the validity of the regulations by Estate of Park issues
a challenge to the Congress aptly stated by Judge Goffe in his dissenting
opinion in Estate of Smith:
If additional safeguards are needed they should come from the
Congress, not from the Secretary or his delegate in the form of unau-
thorized regulations. . . [T]he estate tax must be safeguarded from
unauthorized and unwarranted limitations imposed by regulations as
well as abuses which may occur elsewhere."
ROBERT DEWITT DEARBORN
Income Tax - Triumph of Form Over Substance-Private Income Aver-
aging
Taxpayers have long attempted to avoid the payment of federal
income taxes by transferring their future income to other persons and
having the transferees pay the taxes on the income at a lesser rate. The
Internal Revenue Service and the majority of the cases that have consid-
ered these schemes have disallowed such anticipatory assignments of
income and have assessed taxes against the original recipient of the
income, the assignor, in the years in which the income is received by the
assignee. In the recent case of Estate of Stranahan v. Commissioner,'
however, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit allowed a taxpayer-
assignor to avoid paying taxes on the income in the later years; the
assignee paid the taxes instead. This avoidance was accomplished by the
taxpayer "selling" his rights to the future income and paying taxes on
the "sale price" in the year of transfer, a maneuver which resulted in a
substantial tax saving for the assignor.2
This decision is a poor one for two reasons. Specifically, the money
received by the taxpayer from his assignee had more of the characteris-
tics of a loan than payment for the purchase of an asset. If the transfer
of the 122,820 dollars were a loan, there would have been no tax conse-
quences at the time of the assignment of the income, and the income-
"United States v. Stapf, 375 U.S. 118, 131 (1963).
"57 T.C. at 665.
1472 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1973).21d. at 869-70.
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going to the assignee in the later years would have been viewed simply
as a repayment of the loan upon which the assignor would have been
taxed in those years. A more general criticism is that even if the transfer
were valid sale, the decision not to tax the assignor in later years appears
erroneous in light of other anticipatory assignment cases which have
disallowed such shifting of the incidence of the tax.' As a result of this
apparent break with past cases, the Stranahan decision could mark a
major victory for taxpayers by giving them a tremendously powerful tax
planning tool for averaging expected future income.'
The facts of the case are fairly simple. Stranahan was a cash basis
taxpayer who had made a large payment in 1964 to the Internal Reve-
nue Service pursuant to a closing agreement concerning tax deficiencies
related to several personal trusts. As a result, Stranahan was entitled
to such a large interest deduction in 1964 that it exceeded his income
for the year. He was not eligible to carry his net operating loss forward
or back because section 172 of the Internal Revenue Code5 limits car-
ryovers to businesses losses. In order to retain the benefit of the interest
deduction, he increased his ordinary income for 1964 by "selling" his
rights to future dividends on stock that he owned (but not the stock
itself) to his son and accordingly reported the money received from the
son as taxable ordinary income for 1964.6
According to the agreement reached between Stranahan and his
son, beginning in 1965 the son was to receive all the dividends from
certain stock in Champion Spark Plug Company until the cumulative
amount of dividends paid to the son reached 122,820 dollars, at which
time any further dividend income was to return to Stranahan. 7 The son
paid Stranahan 115,000 dollars for the dividend rights, the present value
of 122,820 dollars of future income, discounted by five per cent, the then
3E.g., Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940);
Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U.S. 136 (1932); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
'Stranahan was able to reduce his overall taxes by paying the tax on the income in the earlier
year rather than in subsequent years because the "sale" allowed him to take advantage of a large
deduction. Such sale arrangements by taxpayers to take advantage of large deductions will likely
occur so infrequently that they will not likely result in any significant revenue loss to the federal
government. Taxpayers will, however, be able to reduce significantly their taxes by selling future
income and paying taxes in earlier years when they are in lower tax brackets. The taxpayers will
receive the same amount of income but through the "sales" procedure they can spread the income
over several years and thus minimize the effect of the progressive rate structure. Thus Stranahan's
acceleration plan has universal applications.
'INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 172.
1472 F.2d at 868.
7Id.
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prevailing interest rate for standard commercial loans. Although no
dividends had been declared at the time of the transfer, the 122,820
dollars was expected to be paid to the son within three years. This
expectation was based on the long history of regular dividend payments
by Champion, 8 a fact known by both parties to the agreement as both
were employees and stockhokders of the firm.9 Pursuant to the agree-
ment Stranahan notified the transfer agents for Champion and directed
them to pay the dividends directly to the son until the 122,820 dollars
was accumulated. 10
In 1965 the son received a total of 40,050 dollars in dividends as a
result of the agreement. He included this amount less his basis in his
ordinary income for that year and paid the taxes on it. Stranahan had
not included this amount in his 1965 income, so the Commissioner filed
a deficiency notice against Stranahan's estate" for the tax on the 40,050
dollars of dividends. The Tax Court held for the Commissioner, relying
on Helvering v. Horst 2 and related cases, finding that the transaction
between Stranahan and his son was "not a bona fide sale" and was
"devoid of any substantive purpose other than tax avoidance.' ' 3
On appeal the Sixth Circuit reversed the Tax Court's decision14 and
determined that the father-son assignment was a valid arm's-length sale
for sufficient consideration. The court distinguished Stranahan from
Horst which had taxed an assignor of future income, by saying that the
Horst principle referred only to gratuitous assignments of future income
and not to sales for valid consideration.15
LOAN VERSUS SALE
Section 45 1(a) of the Code states the general rule that a cash basis
'Estate of Frank D. Stranahan, 40 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1133, 1136 (1971). Actually the
$122,820 was paid in less time than originally estimated, because Champion raised its dividend rates
in 1965.
Old.
I'Stranahan and his son complied completely with all the formalities of a sale. The purchase
price was actually paid to Stranahan, the son used his own money in the transaction, and the
dividends were paid directly to the son, not through Stranahan. Id. at 1135.
"Stranahan died in November of 1965 so actually the Commissioner assessed the deficiency
against Stranahan's estate for dividends declared between January and November of 1965. Id. at
1135.
12311 U.S. 112 (1940).
"40 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. at 1138.
"Estate of Stranahan v. Commissioner, 472 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1973).
"Id. at 870.
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taxpayer is to be taxed in the year in which he receives income. 6 Clearly,
however, neither this section nor section 61, the general gross income
provision, considers proceeds from a loan to be taxable income. A loan
in which the proceeds must be repaid by the borrower and a sale of
rights to future income in which the purchase price is paid over a period
of time are similar transactions in appearance, and consequently it is
often difficult to discern the true nature of these transactions. Theoreti-
cally, in a sale all rights of ownership are transferred to the buyer;
whereas in a loan, the lender merely relinquishes possession of the prop-
erty being loaned, not ownership. In practice, however, it is difficult to
determine whether all the rights have been shifted. The key used to
determine whether substantially all the rights of ownership have been
transferred is the allocation of risk associated with the property. In a
sale the buyer assumes the risks attached to the property being sold, but
with a loan arrangement the risk element normally does not change
hands; the status quo is maintained." When no risk-shifting occurs as
in Stranahan, the transfer should be characterized as a loan."
One major indicator that the risk was not transferred from Strana-
han to his son was that the future dividend income was discounted by
the standard five per cent interest factor which would have been applied
to any routine commercial loan. No adjustment was made for an addi-
tional risk factor. There was no substantial danger that Stranahan's son
would not receive the future dividends he had been assigned. Champion
Spark Plug had a long history of profitable operations and dividend
distributions, and there was no indication that this pattern would be
broken in the near future. 0 Because both Stranahan and his son, as large
stockholders in Champion, were in a position to exert influence over
6INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 451(a).
"I1d. § 61(a).
sFor example, if a buyer purchased a horse and the animal died subsequent to the sale, then
the buyer would suffer the loss since death was one of the risks that he assumed. In contrast, if
one borrowed a horse from a friend for breeding purposes and the horse died during the borrowing
period, the borrower would suffer no loss since the risk of death remained with the owner-friend,
assuming, of course, that the borrower was not the cause of death.
"In 1965, in Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 574 (1965), the Supreme Court stated
that "risk-shifting ... has not heretofore been considered an essential ingredient of a sale for tax
purposes." Brown was not an ordinary sale case, however, because it concerned a "bootstrap" sale
of a business by a corporation to a charitable institution with the purchase price payable out of
the future earnings of the business. A sale to a charity is a narrow area of the law involving special
considerations such as the tax exempt status of these institutions and their lack of capital available
for investment. These factors were not present in Stranahan.
2OSee note 8 supra and note 21 infra.
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corporate dividend policy, the chance that the dividend payments would
cease within the three years needed to pay off the 122,820 dollars was
negligible.21
The risk question presented in the Stranahan case is relatively novel
because most cases considering prior assignment of future income were
either clearly gratuitous assignments22 or sales, 3 and the loan versus
sale problem never arose. One recently decided case, J. A. Martin,4
however, did involve this risk question because, like Stranahan, it con-
cerned an attempted acceleration of income. In Martin, the cash basis
taxpayer had suffered a large personal loss in 1966. In order to obtain
the full benefit of the deduction, he assigned future rental income from
an apartment house in return for 225,000 dollars in 1966. The assignee
of the future income was to receive the rent until he received 225,000
dollars plus a seven percent "supplemental sum." The taxpayer made
no guarantee that the 225,000 dollars would be repaid, but he did agree
to keep the apartment operating for two full years following the assign-
ment." The Tax Court and the Fifth Circuit found the transaction to
be merely a loan and taxed the taxpayer not in 1966, but in 1967 when
the actual rents were paid. The court said, "[ain anticipatory assign-
ment, such as this, no matter how ingeniously and elegantly contrived,
is not to be disposed of by attenuated subtleties. We conclude that the
transaction instigated by J. A. Martin was purely and simply a'device
to avoid the proper taxation of the petitioners. '27
The Sixth Circuit in Stranahan distinguished the result in Martin
on the fact that the borrower in Martin had guaranteed to keep the
business operating, whereas Stranahan had made no such warranty.28
"In 1963, 64% of the stock of Champion Spark Plug Co. was owned by and for the Stranahan
family and by the directors of the corporation, and both Stranahan and his son were directors.
MooDY's MANUAL 945 (F. St. Clair ed. 1963). Moody's Manual for 1964 only states that a
majority of the stock was owned by and for the Stranahan family and by the directors. Three of
the seven directors were members of the Stranahan family. MOODY's MANUAL 1506 (F. St. Clair
ed. 1964). The dividend rights from the 26,700 shares of stock in the transaction between Stranahan
and his son, however, represented only approximately one-half of one per cent of the shares of
Champion then outstanding.
"See cases cited notes 39-41 infra.
13See cases cited note 48 infra.
2156 T.C. 1255 (1971), affd mer., 469 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1973).
156 T.C. at 1257. The $225,000 and the seven per cent supplement were actually repaid in the
following year, 1967.
261d.
271d. at 1260.
21472 F.2d at 871.
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This seems a specious distinction since there was little doubt that Cham-
pion would remain in operation for at least three years. The continua-
tion of corporate operations was simply assumed, and neither Strana-
han nor his son felt the need to insert a continuation clause into their
agreement. Furthermore, unlike the taxpayer in Martin, Stranahan
dealt with a relative, making the transaction look even more like a loan
instead of an arm's-length sale. Thus it seems very difficult to distin-
guish the facts of Martin from those of Stranahan; both clearly appear
to be transfers of money with repayment practically assured in the
future, the assignee effectively accepting no risk.
The right to income from future stock dividends is recognized
under Ohio law as a property right apart from ownership in the corpora-
tion which the stock represents.29 An assignment of future dividend
rights might be deemed a sale of an asset, particularly when the rights
transferred are the rights to all future income, rather than income for a
limited number of years." Over a long period of time there is a substan-
tial risk that the dividends would increase or decrease. On the other
hand, a three-year assignment of future dividends in a financially secure
corporation is not likely to involve any major risk of lost dividends.',
Furthermore, even if Stranahan's assignment were a valid sale of
property under state law, formal compliance with local property law is
not always binding in tax matters. Gregory v. Helvering2 long ago
established the principle that, while "[t]he legal right of a taxpayer to
decrease the amount of what otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether
avoid them, by means which the law permits, cannot be doubted,"33
the form of a transaction does not control over its substance.34 The
Gregory reasoning is not isolated dicta; many other courts have stressed
that the substance of a transaction controls over the form35 and have
"Lamkin v. Robinson, 10 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 1,44 (Com. Pleas Ct. 1910), affd, 88 Ohio St. 603,
106 N.E. 1065 (1913) (mem.).
'lt is likely that the transfer would not have to be of all dividend rights; an assignment of
income for thirty or forty years could also be considered a piece of property. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1031(a)-I(c) (1956), where a thirty-year lease is deemed the equivalent of a fee. A transfer of
a twenty-year lease, however, did not qualify as an assignment of property. Gait v. Commissioner,
216 F.2d 41 (7th Cir. 1954). See also cases cited note 42 infra.
3
'Moreover, Stranahan and his son were in a position to exert control over Champion's
dividend policy. See note 21 supra.
32293 U.S. 465 (1935).
11Id. at 469.
3Id. at 470.
21The Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945), said,
"[t]o permit the true nature of a transaction to be disguised by mere formalisms, which exist solely
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consequently freely delved into the underlying motives of transac-
tions.6 Thus the Sixth Circuit was not compelled to find that the
assignment in Stranahan was a sale simply because it conformed to a
sale of "property" under state law.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF ASSIGNMENT OF INCOME
The prior discussion of Stranahan was concerned with the particu-
lar facts of the case and the wisdom of the determination that the
assignment was a sale rather than a loan. The effects of the Stranahan
decision, however, will not be limited to the specific facts of the case,
for it will likely have far reaching consequences, touching several areas
of the tax law.
Two lines of cases considering assignment of future income are
relevant to Stranahan-those cases in which the assignor transferred
rights to future income for no consideration or clearly inadequate con-
sideration, 37 and those cases in which the assignor sold for adequate
consideration rights to future income and tried unsuccessfully to get
capital gains treatment for the sale.38 Where the assignor has made a
gift of the future income, the Supreme Court in Lucas v. Earl,39 Blair
v. Commissioner," Helvering v. Horst,41 and related cases, has estab-
lished certain basic principles. When the donor gives away only the
rights to future income he will be taxed on that income in the year the
donee receives the earnings; 42 when the donor gives away the property
which will produce the future income as well as the rights to the future
earnings, then the donor will not be taxed on the income. 3 The Court's
to alter tax liabilities, would seriously impair the effective administration of the tax policies of
Congress." In Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334-35 (1940), the Court similarly held that,
"[t]echnical considerations, niceties of the law of trusts and conveyances, or the legal paraphernalia
which inventive genius may construct as a refuge from surtaxes should not obscure the basic
issue. . .And . . .devices which, though valid under state law, are not conclusive so far as § 22
(a) is concerned." See also B. BITTKER & J. EuSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORA-
TIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ch. 14, at 99 (3d ed. 1971), for a discussion of the meaning of Gregory.
31E.g., Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960). Knetsch is analogous to Stranahan
since the Court in that case disallowed a scheme by the taxpayer to accelerate his interest deduc-
tions because the plan lacked a substantive purpose.
"See notes 39-41 and accompanying text infra.
'sSee notes 47-48 and accompanying text infra.
39281 U.S. Ill (1930).
40300 U.S. 5 (1937).
41311 U.S. 112 (1940).
"
2Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122, 125 (1940); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 118-19
(1940); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 11, 115 (1930).
3Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5, 13-14 (1937). In Blair the taxpayer assigned his entire
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reasoning is that the donor receives "satisfaction" income for his gift,
and accordingly he is taxed on the satisfaction obtained.4
Stranahan as assignor agreed that he should be taxed but con-
tended that he should be taxed in the year of the transfer (1964), rather
than in the years the assignee was to receive the income (1965-67) In
the gift cases, the courts have taxed the donor-taxpayer in the years in
which the donees received the transferred income, not in the year of the
transfer.45 Stranahan, however, was not a gift case; rather the transac-
tion in it was deemed a "sale" by the court, with the transferor receiving
payment in the year of transfer. One of the pervading principles which
underlies the Internal Revenue Code is that the taxpayer should be
taxed at the time he has the ability to pay, which is when he has the
cash income in his possession. 6 This principle provides a logical reason
for taxing Stranahan in the year of the transfer, although the donors as
in Helvering v. Eubank" were not taxed until the income was actually
paid. Since the donor receives nothing for his gift, his ability to pay
taxes on the income is not enhanced in the transfer year.
There have been numerous cases prior to Stranahan,s involving
life estate in a trust and the Court held that this was a transfer of property, relieving the assignor
of the tax burden. In Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941), however, the assignor was not
relieved of the tax burden where she assigned a specific amount of trust income for only one year.
The Court thus found that the income interest was not for a sufficient length of time to be converted
to property.
"In Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940), the assignor detached several interest coupons
from bonds he owned and gave the coupons, but not the bonds themselves, to his son. The Court,
in finding the assignor taxable on the interest income received by his son, said:
Such a use of his economic gain, the right to receive income, to procure a satisfaction
which can be obtained only by the expenditure of money or property, would seem to be
the enjoyment of the income whether the satisfaction is the purchase of goods at the
corner grocery, the payment of his debt there, . . . or a gift to his favorite son. Even
though he never receives the money, he derives money's worth from the disposition of
the coupons . . . . The enjoyment of the economic benefit accruing to him by virtue of
his acquisition of the coupons is realized as completely as it would have been if he
[taxpayer] had collected the interest in dollars and expended them for any of the pur-
poses named.
Id. at 117.
"Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941); Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940); Lucas
v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930); Rev. Rul. 58-275, 1958-1 CUm. BULL. 22; see Lyon & Eustice,
Assignment of Income: Fruit and Tree as Irrigated by the P. G. Lake Case, 17 TAX L. REv. 295,
353-56 (1962).
"Cohen, Permissible Reserves and Deferment of Income in Tax Accounting, U. So. CAL. 1957
TAX INST. 329, 334.
47311 U.S. 122 (1940). In this discussion it is assumed that the assignor has not assigned the
income producing property also.
"E.g., Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958); Hort v. Commissioner, 313
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sales of assets or rights related to future income in which the taxpayer
has been taxed normally in the year of the transfer,49 which was Strana-
han's objective. Although in many of these cases the year in which the
tax should be levied was not in issue, the courts and commentators have
generally reasoned that the need for a parallel with the gift cases, in
which the donor was taxed in the later years, must yield to the ability
to pay principle." Stranahan differs from these sale cases, however,
because in those cases the taxpayers had purposes other than tax avoid-
ance.51 In contrast, Stranahan's sole purpose in making the assignment
to his son was to reduce his tax liability.52 The courts have long required
a transaction to have a valid business purpose before it will be effective
for tax purposes.53 Since Stranahan failed to meet this requirement,
there is a strong reason for not allowing him to be taxed in the year of
the transfer, a reason which probably is superior to the ability to pay
principle in light of the many exceptions in the Code to this cash basis
standard.54
Since section 172 allows carryforwards and carrybacks of net oper-
U.S. 28 (1941); General Artists Corp. v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 360 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 345
U.S. 866 (1953).
"In each of these cases, the taxpayer had tried unsuccessfully to get capital gains treatment
for the transfer, by labeling the right to future income a capital asset. The courts viewed the
consideration for the assignment as a mere substitute for the ordinary income the taxpayer would
have received if the sale had not occurred. Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260, 265
(1958); Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28, 31 (1941); General Artists Corp. v. Commissioner,
205 F.2d 360, 361 (2d Cir. 1953).
"E. Blakeney Gleason, II P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1477 (1942); Zarkey, Capital Gain Concepts,
U. So. CAL. 1959 TAX IN sT. 357, 370; Income: Whose, When, and What Kind: A Panel Discussion,
N.Y.U. 24th INST. ON FED. TAX., 1319, 1324 (1966); Note, The P. G. Lake Guides to Ordinary
Income, 14 STAN. L. REV. 551, 562 (1962). In Commissioner v. Slagter, 238 F.2d 701 (7th Cir.
1956), the court taxed the taxpayer when the transferee received the income, but the court consid-
ered the transaction more of a loan than a sale.
"For example, in Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941), the tenant who leased the
taxpayer's building had demanded release from his lease which still had nine years to run. In
contrast, in Stranahan it was admitted that the only objective of the assignment was to reduce
Stranahan's taxes. 472 F.2d at 869. The father did not need the $115,000 to pay the interest on his
closing agreement concerning the private trusts. Id. 869 n.4. Nor was there an assertion that the
son had idle funds and needed a good five per cent investment.
"See note 51 supra. There are, of course, tax considerations in almost every transaction, but
this discussion refers only to those transactions in which tax avoidance is the sole purpose.
13 Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1932); Jones v. Commissioner, 306 F.2d 292,
296 (5th Cir. 1962); J. A. Martin, 56 T.C. 1255, 1260 (1971). See also notes 32-34 and accompany-
ing text supra.
5"E.g., § 166 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 permits deductions for estimated bad debts,
§ 446 permits taxpayers to use the accrual method if it fairly reflects their income, § 456 permits
taxpayers who receive prepaid dues to spread the income over the period of the liability.
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ating losses for only business losses,5 Stranahan could not qualify for
any carryovers since his loss was caused by a large payment of nonbusi-
ness interest. Statutorily he was allowed to take the interest deduction
in 1964, a year in which he would not get the full benefit of the deduc-
tion. However, he was able to benefit fully from his nonbusiness interest
deduction under a scheme for which Congress had made no provision."
Thus the sale by Stranahan had no purpose other than the circumven-
tion of the unambiguous language of section 172. On many occasions
the courts have stated that they will not allow the taxpayer to avoid the
intent of Congress by some artful dodge. Consequently, since the
transaction in Stranahan appears to be a sale only in form but not in
substance, since the transaction lacked a business purpose, and since it
intentionally contradicted section 172, a strong presumption arises
against allowing Stranahan to be taxed in the year of the transfer despite
the ability to pay doctrine." The closest case factually, Martin, certainly
reached this result.
Conclusion
The danger of the Stranahan decision extends beyond the context
of the case because relatively few taxpayers will need to accelerate
income to cover as large a personal deduction as Stranahan. The case,
however, could become a major tax avoidance tool because it seemingly
will permit taxpayers to execute private income averaging schemes
OINT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 172.
56The latest indication of Congress' intent toward acceleration of income is revealed by the
case of Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958) and its aftermath. In Lake the
taxpayer corporation, in order to cancel a debt of $600,000, assigned the creditor oil payment rights
payable out of the profits earned on oil leases owned by the corporation. The Lake court treated
the assignment as a sale and included the $600,000 in the taxpayer's income in the year of transfer,
taxable, however, at ordinary rates. In the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 503(a),
68A Stat. 207, Congress added § 636 of the Internal Revenue Code, which treats all such assign-
ments of oil payment rights as mortgage loans rather than sales; now there is no tax effect in the
year of sale and the assignor is taxed in subsequent years on the income assigned. It does not seem
logical that Congress would want to disallow accelerations of oil income rights but allow similar
accelerations of dividend income.
5 Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945), Helvering v. Gregory, 293 U.S.
465 (1935).
0One other distinguishing characteristic between Stranahan and the "pseudo-capital gains"
cases is that in most of the latter group the assignor was transferring more than just three years of
income. It normally was either all the income the taxpayer owned or the income covered larger
periods of time than three years. Contra, Rhodes' Estate v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 50 (6th Cir.
1942).
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apart from the averaging scheme provided in the Code.59 For example,
a twenty-seven-year-old intern, anticipating that his peak income-
producing years would be between his fortieth and fiftieth birthdays,
could arrange to "sell" some of his expected income to a trusting indi-
vidual, receive a yearly payment for the next five or six years, and report
the consideration received as income in the years it was received. Since
he is presently an intern in a comparatively low income bracket for the
next few years, the taxes on these annual payments would be much less
than the taxes would be in later years when he has moved to a higher
bracket. The young doctor could save the consideration he received until
he reaches forty and be in exactly the same economic position as if he
were then earning the income, yet his overall tax liabilities would be
much less. Since Congress has established a comprehensive income av-
eraging scheme, 0 it is highly unlikely that it intended to leave room for
any private averaging schemes such as the one hypothesized. This
loop4hole may be available, however, after Stranahan.
E. GRAHAM McGOOGAN, JR.
Property Law-North Carolina's Marketable Title Act-Will the
Exceptions Swallow the Rule?
Shouts of jubilation from weary title examiners resounded through
dusty deed vaults in courthouses across North Carolina as news spread
of the enactment of a marketable title act' that would reduce the length
of title searches to thirty years. Initial joy was supplanted by disappoint-
ment, however, when a reading of the act, effective October 1, 1973,
revealed thirteen exceptions to the thirty year limitation. 2
Marketable title acts have evolved in answer to the major short-
coming of the recording system. When the common law maxim of "first
in time, first in right" yielded to the concept that he who first records
an interest in real property gains primacy over a subsequent recorder
of that interest 3 a title recordation system arose that preserved indefi-
5
"INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 1301-05.
Cold.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. Ch. 47B (1973 Advance Legislative Service, pamphlet no. 3).
2Id. § 47B-3 (1973 Advance Legislative Service, pamphlet no. 3).
'Payne, The Alabama Law Institute's Land Title Acts Project: Part I, 24 ALA. L. REV. 175,
181 (1971).
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nitely technical defects impairing marketability.4 As the chain of title,
originating by sovereign grant, adds new links, generation by genera-
tion, the likelihood that a defective transfer will occur increases with a
consequent expansion of the title examiner's time and energy in his
effort to discover it.5
The obstacles encountered daily by title examiners illustrate the
need for remedial legislation to correct the imperfections of the record-
ing system. Ancient deeds, transcribed in longhand and difficult to read,
often contain references to natural monuments long since vanished or
to the lines of adjoining landowners that are now impossible to locate.'
Restrictions and encumbrances with no one in existence to assert them
are preserved, and interests such as possibilities of reverter or rights of
entry prohibit full enjoyment of property indefinitely.7 Facts extrinsic
to the record such as fraud or failure of delivery render titles insecure.8
Since no determination of title is conclusive, each successive grantee of
a tract must obtain expert assurance that the title is marketable.' The
inevitable result is the "flyspecking" that makes the title search a risky,
tedious, and expensive service. Finally, the transition from rural to
urban society, complemented by increased home ownership, mortgag-
ing, and business activity, compounds the frequency with which these
problems arise."0
4
"Once an interest is placed on the books in the register's office, there is no existing method
to cleanse the records periodically of the barnacles of antiquated interests, however obsolete."
Webster, The Quest for Clear Titles-Making Land Title Searches Shorter and Surer In North
Carolina via Marketable Title Legislation, 44 N.C.L. REv. 89, 101 (1965). "The story is told that
in some counties across America, a clerk would record a recipe if it were acknowledgedl" Barnett,
Marketable Title Acts-Panacea or Pandemonium?, 53 CORNELL L. Q. 45, 86 (1967).
The North Carolina recording statutes were enacted in 1885 and are known as the Connor
Act, ch. 147, § 1, [1885] N.C. Sess. L. 1245. The relevant statutes are N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 47-18,
-20 (1966). These are pure race statutes because they protect "any purchaser for value of specific
land who records first, whether he has notice of a prior unrecorded conveyance or not, and
irrespective of whether he is a prior or subsequent purchaser." J. WEBSTER, REAL ESTATE LAW IN
NORTH CAROLINA 411 (1971).
5P. BASYE, CLEARING LAND TITLES § 171, at 366-67 (2d ed. 1970).
Defects include notarial and probate error such as the negligent omission of a spouse's signa-
ture or seal. Webster, supra note 4, at 97. The North Carolina General Assembly has recently
enacted a statute that prevents the failure to include the notation "seal" after a signature from
rendering a recorded document invalid. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47-108.11 (1973 Advance Legislative
Service, pamphlet no. 6).
OWhitman, Transferring North Carolina Real Estate Part I: How the Present System
Functions, 49 N.C.L. REv. 413, 425 (1971).
7Hicks, The Oklahoma Record Title Act Introduction, 9 TULSA L.J. 68, 68-71 (1973).
81d.
OBarnett, supra note 4, at 45-46.
"GHicks, supra note 7, at 69.
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Initial response to the conveyancing crisis came from the Iowa
legislature in 1919 in the form of a statute that extinguished claims
arising before 1900."1 The object of the Iowa act and the marketable title
legislation that followed was to simplify land transactions and to protect
purchasers of real property by making title examinations more secure.'
The labor and difficulty involved in conveyancing were reduced by re-
quiring examination of recent records only. 3 In 1945 the marketable
title concept gained momentum when Michigan adopted a prototype of
the Model Marketable Title Act. 4 Subsequently, thirteen other states
adopted similar legislation with varying degrees of sophistication and
adaptation to local need." In their operation these acts contain elements
of marketable title acts, curative acts, or statutes of limitation. 6
The North Carolina Act follows the pattern common to most mar-
ketable title legislation. 17 It requires examination of only recent records
and establishes a point in time, often called the root of title, that marks
the beginning of the chain. 18 If an owner presently has a record chain
of title for thirty years, all conflicting claims based on title transactions
prior to the thirty year period are eliminated. His title is marketable
"Ch. 270, § 1 [1919] Iowa Acts 316 (now IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 614.17 (1950), as amended,
(Supp. 1973).
11L. SIMES & C. TAYLOR, THE IMPROVEMENT OF CONVEYANCING BY LEGISLATION XV (1960).
131d.
"No. 200, §§ 1-9 [1945] Mich. Pub. Acts 267 (now MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 565.101 -. 109
(1948). Lewis Simes and Clarence Taylor of the University of Michigan School of Law through a
project with the Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law of the American Bar Association
used the Michigan Act as the basis for the Model Act.
"
5 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-33(b) to -33(1) (Supp. 1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 712.01-.10
(1969); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, §§ 12.1-.4 (Smith-Hurd 1966); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 56-1101 to -
S1110 (Supp. 1972); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 614.17-.20, .29-.38 (1950), as amended, (Supp. 1972);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 565.101-.109 (1948); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.023 (Supp. 1973);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-288 to -298 (1971); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-19A-01 to -11 (1960); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5301.47-.56 (Page 1970); OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, §§ 71-80 (Supp. 1972); S.D.
COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 43-30-1 to -15 (1967); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 57-9-1 to -10 (1953), as
amended, (Supp. 1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, §§ 601-06 (Cum. Supp. 1973); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 893.15 (1966).
'
8Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 106-07, 83 N.W.2d 800, 816 (1957). See text accompa-
nying notes 37-39 infra.
"The North Carolina Act originated from a draft by James A. Webster, Jr. of Wake Forest
University School of Law patterned after the Model Marketable Title Act. It has been presented
to the General Assembly several times since 1965. For an analysis of the proposed act, see Webster,
supra note 4.
""Real property transfers should be possible with economy and expediency. The status and
security of recorded real property titles should be determinable from an examination of recent
records only." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47B-1(4) (1973 Advance Legislative Service, pamphlet no. 3).
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subject to (1) claims excepted from the operation of the act, 9 (2) all
encumbrances arising on or since the root of title,"0 and (3) ancient
claims, otherwise extinguished, that are preserved by re-recording them
with the register of deeds.21
The thirty year period used to establish the root of title under the
North Carolina Act falls between the minimum period of twenty2 and
maximum of fifty years adopted by other states. 2 The length of the
period is crucial because an excessively long period forfeits the basic
value of the act, and one that is too short increases the risk that too
many notices to preserve old interests will be filed.24 While most states
have adopted a forty year period,25 North Carolina's thirty year period
is commendable because the starting point in 1943 falls after the Depres-
sion when defective tax sales, foreclosures, and generally inferior con-
veyancing techniques left title records in great confusion. 26 Barring the
rare occasion when the root of title falls on a transfer recorded exactly
thirty years prior to the present transaction, the chain will begin at the
transaction next preceeding the thirty year period. 7 For example, if A
presently claims title under a grant from 0 recorded in 1913, and no
subsequent conveyances have occurred, A's root of title begins in 1913,
not 1943. Similarly, if 0 had conveyed to X in 1913, and A claims title
by deed from X recorded in 1953, A's root of title again begins in 1913.8
In its operation the statute incorporates a device that allows re-
recordation of interests that would otherwise be extinguished. To illus-
trate, consider the following example. 0 conveys Blackacre by deed
recorded in 1913 to X "so long as no tavern is constructed on the
property." In 1943 X conveys to A making no mention of the restric-
tion. In 1973 A's title is no longer subject to the 1913 prohibition. Had
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47B-3(l)-(l3) (1973 Advance Legislative Service, pamphlet no. 3).
-Id. § 47B-3(l) (1973 Advance Legislative Service, pamphlet no. 3).
21Id. § 47B-4 (1973 Advance Legislative Service, pamphlet no. 3).
22N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-19A-01 (1960).
2IND. ANN. STAT. § 56-1101 (Supp. 1972).
11L. SIMES & C. TAYLOR, supra note 12, at xxiv.
2'CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-33(c) (Supp. 1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 12.1 (Smith-
Hurd 1966); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.023 (Supp. 1973); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.48 (Page
1970); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-9-1 (1953), as amended, (Supp. 1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 601
(Supp. 1973).
2"Payne, supra note 3, at 194.
2'Webster, supra note 4, at 107.
28Assume 0 gave a mortgage to M in 1943 and interest payments are still being made. If 0
sold the property to A in 1953, M should record a preserving notice in 1983 since it is A's thirty
year period that is crucial, not M's.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47B-2(c) (1973 Advance Legislative Service, pamphlet no. 3).
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the deed recorded in 1943 contained a reference such as "this convey-
ance subject to the restriction found in deed of 1913 recorded in deed
book 30, page 160 of Z county registry," the restriction would be pre-
served.30 A general reference in the 1943 deed such as "subject to
easements and restrictions of record" would fail to preserve the excep-
tion.3 1 Finally, if 0 desired to preserve his restriction, he could record
his claim with the register of deeds before October 1, 1976, and the
restriction would remain enforceable for thirty years and would be sub-
ject to re-recordation at the end of that period.12
Section 47B-5 which provides the owner of an interest recorded at
any time prior to 1943 a three year "transitional" period to re-record
and preserve that interest will become unnecessary after 1976. Without
this provision, however, the constitutionality of the act could bejeopard-
ized. As purely retroactive legislation it could impair contractual rights
and could deprive owners of their property without due process.13 This
section also provides those who do not follow legislative enactments
closely an adequate opportunity to learn of the legislation, and to re-
record their interests.
In addition to an understanding of the statute's general operation,
it is essential to examine its individual provisions. Section 47B-1 sum-
marizes the problems that have required marketable title legislation and
states the objectives of the act. The only substantive value of this salu-
tary provision is an affirmative identification of the legislative intent
which could bolster court opinion in subsequent judicial interpreta-
tion .34
Section 47B-2 affirmatively defines marketability and serves as an
orientation to the individual provisions of the act. It greatly reduces the
risk that an exception will be overlooked because it limits title examina-
tion to recent records.35 It provides a comprehensive definition of mar-
ketability, however, only in the sense that marketability is determined
by examination of instruments recorded during the restricted period.
-Id. § 47B-3(l) (1973 Advance Legislative Service, pamphlet no. 3).
311d.
"Id. § 47B-5 (1973 Advance Legislative Service, pamphlet no. 3). An ethical question arises
whether an attorney, aware that a former client could lose a property interest, should advise of
this potential loss or should remain silent to avoid solicitation.
Since certain interests, such as possibilities of reverter and rights of entry unduly restrict
property enjoyment, perhaps a limit should be placed on the right to re-record.
"P. BASYE, supra note 5, § 175, at 384.
3Webster, supra note 4, at 103-04.
"Id. at 105.
1973]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
True marketability continues to depend upon the legality of those in-
struments and the interests created by them.36
Defining marketability in affirmative terms does, however, exem-
plify true marketable title legislation by expressly eliminating old incon-
sistent claims while statute of limitations acts do so only by implication
through barring a remedy.3 Subsection (c) which states that "all rights,
estates, interests, claims or charges whatsoever" that arose prior to the
root of title are extinguished carries this cleansing process one step
further and adds a curative provision to remove all doubt that old claims
are eliminated. Significantly, the incapacity of a claimant eligible to
assert an old claim will not prevent its elimination as a cloud upon
title.38 This is another improvement over acts that function as a statute
of limitations because the effectiveness of the act is more important than
the infrequent deprivation of property from one under disability."
Subsection (d) states that the establishment of marketable record
title pursuant to the act shall be prima facie evidence of ownership in
actions for the recovery of real property, to quiet title, or to recover
damages for trespass. This provision, unique among marketable title
acts, is in answer to a dilemma that typically arose in disputes over large
stands of timber in rural areas. Under preexisting law, a stranger could
move into a remote tract and begin to harvest the trees. In order to
prevent this practice judicially, the true owner was forced to institute a
trespass suit where validity of his title was essential to recovery."° Since
proof of a complete chain of title from the sovereign usually proved
impossible,4 violent remedies often replaced judicial ones.
Section 47B-3, which lists thirteen items excepted from the act's
coverage, radically departs from the pristine concept of marketable title
legislation that title transfer should be facilitated by reference to recent
records only. Each encumbrance excepted remains a cloud upon title
even if it arose prior to the root of title." While exceptions are charac-
31P. BASYE, supra note 5, § 172, at 371; L. SIMEs & C. TAYLOR, supra note 12, at 1I.
3P. BASYE, supra note 5, § 173, at 372. Under a statute of limitations a plaintiff loses a right
because he fails to sue within a designated time. Under a marketable title act the plaintiff loses
his right because he fails to file a preserving notice.
'8N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47B-2(c) (1973 Advance Legislative Service, pamphlet no. 3).
"'Webster, supra note 4, at 115-16. Some might question the constitutionality of an act that
can extinguish the property rights of those under disability.
40E.g., Andrews v. Bruton, 242 N.C. 93, 86 S.E.2d 786 (1955).
""In an action for the recovery of land and for trespass thereon a denial by defendant of
plaintiff's title places upon plaintiff the burden -of proving title in himself and the trespass of
defendant." Cutts v. Casey, 271 N.C. 165, 167, 155 S.E.2d 519, 521 (1967).
12Barnett, supra note 4, at 86-87.
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teristic of all the marketable title acts,43 the greater their frequency, the
more drastic is the reduction of the act's utility.4
Subsection 47B-3(3), recognizing the right of those in present pos-
session, is the first actual exception.45 The precept that title searches
should be limited to recent records collides headlong here with the.
deference the common law accorded possession. Possession, absent.
marketable title legislation, has always been important because it may
ripen into full title under adverse possession and because possession
inconsistent with record title serves as constructive notice of an unre-
corded right."
Although this exception will require a trip to view the property in
addition to the record search,47 it serves two functions. First, inquiry into
possession protects the adverse possessor who has not relinquished pos-
session before marketability is established.4" Secondly, it hinders a
claimant who asserts title under a "wild deed".49 Assume that in 1913,
"See. e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-33(h) (Supp. 1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 712.03
(1969); IND. ANN. STAT. § 56-1106 (Supp. 1972).
" Another problem marketable title acts are supposed to solve is that posed by
old recorded interests less than a fee simple, to which the title of the fee simple owner is
subject. . . . Easements, equitable servitudes, liens, mineral rights, leases, possibilities
or reverter, and powers of termination are typical examples. If the objective is to ease
the burden of title examination, no really sound argument can be made for cutting off
some of these interests disclosed only in the pre-root chain, unless all so situated are
cut off.
Barnett, supra note 4, at 86.
"Subsections (1), (2) and (10), although listed among the exceptions, are, in reality, descrip-
tions of the operation of the act.
"Barnett, supra note 4, at 60. In another statute relating to the possession of real property
with respect to color of title, the 1973 North Carolina General Assembly provided that by distinctly
marking the physical boundaries, by recording a survey, and by listing and paying taxes on the
property so marked, one can acquire prima facie evidence of possession. N.C. GEN. STAT. § I-
38(b)-(c) (1973 Advance Legislative Service, pamphlet no. 3), amending N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-38
(1966). This statute eliminates much former uncertainty for those claiming title by possession.
Other 1973 legislative innovations affecting real estate transfer include a statute preventing real
estate title insurance companies from providing information or insurance without a title examina-
tion and the opinion of a North Carolina attorney, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-132 (1973 Advance
Legislative Service, pamphlet no. 2), amending N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-132 (1966), and another
providing that the tax collector's certificate of assessment is conclusive. The certificate removes
real estate taxes and special assessments as liens upon the property covered against those who rely
on the certificate by paying the taxes and assessments, purchasing or leasing the property, or
lending money secured by the real property. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-361 (1973 Advance Legislative
Service, pamphlet no. 7), amending N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-361 (1966).
"Barnett, supra note 4, at 63-64; Webster, supra note 4, at 109-10.
"Webster, supra note 4, at 108.
"Id. at 109.
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O conveys Blackacre to X who takes possession and remains there until
the North Carolina Act is implemented in 1973. Assume further that
in 1915, Rascal, a stranger, purports to convey Blackacre to Y. Both X
and Y will have muniments of title that meet the statutory scheme and
give each marketable title, but an orthodox search by a purchaser from
X will fail to reveal the other independent chain. An inquiry that would
reveal the possession of X greatly reduces the likelihood that Y, holding
under a "wild deed" would prevail in asserting his false claim.
Subsection (4) requires an inquiry into the county tax records when
marketability is to be established and answers a second problem that
arises from the wild deed dilemma. If, under the previous set of facts,
X had moved from Blackacre in 1970, with Y moving in as soon as X
was out of sight, nothing would alert a purchaser from Y of X's superior
right. However, a check of the county tax records revealing that X
instead of Y paid the real property taxes would place the purchaser on
notice of the inconsistency and frustrate the "late squatter's" bid for full
title." Although wild deeds occur infrequently, their potential conse-
quences are so disastrous that an exception requiring inquiry into facts
extrinsic to the record is deemed justified.
Subsections (4) through (8) exempt interests, primarily easements
in favor of mining5 and railroad enterprises and water, sewage, gas,
electrical and telephone utilities, from the operation of the act. Here the
policy of the act arguably conflicts with the burden and expense accru-
ing to the holders of these vested interests should they be required to
re-record their claims every thirty years. It is also argued that the public
services provided by these entities entitles them to remain beyond the
operation of the statute52 and that their easements are usually intended
to remain permanently outstanding. 3 Although these compelling rea-
sons have prompted exceptions for easements in almost every marketa-
ble title act,54 the scope of the easement exception provision in the North
10Jd. at 110- 11.
Wild deeds also arise where a grantor executes a second unrecorded conveyance of the same
land. The situation is most apt to arise where one owner, through mistaken land description,
attempts to convey part of another's land. See generally Case Comment, Marketable Record Title
Act: Wild, Forged, and Void Deeds as Roots of Title, 22 U. FLA. L. REv. 669 (1969).
51Although North Carolina is not a major mining state, the lack of specificity in the exception
for mining interests could prove troublesome. See Payne, supra note 3, at 186-93.
51Barnett, supra note 4, at 72.
5Id.
51E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-33(h) (Supp. 1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 712.03(5) (1969);
IND. ANN. STAT. § 56-1106 (Supp. 1972).
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Carolina act is its most serious impediment.
The rationale for extinguishing these interests far outweighs the
reasons for excepting them. No title examiner can certify a title unless
he checks the record for these interests back to the original grant, thus
undermining the purpose of the act.5 Also, the holders of these interests
are primarily large and sophisticated businesses knowledgeable in the
law and financially equipped to integrate the notice filing system into
their business operation. Even if the argument for exempting these
interests should prevail, only those easements observable by physical
inspection should escape the re-recordation requirement for, even under
general property law, non-observable easements that are unrecorded
cannot be asserted against a subsequent purchaser.57 Observable ease-
ments, however, are called to the vendee's attention when he inspects
the property as he is required to do under the present possession excep-
tion."
Subsection (9), excepting interests held by the United States, recog-
nizes that no property interest can be divested from the federal govern-
ment without its consent. Unlike the acts of several other states,"0 the
North Carolina act does not except interests held by the state. Subsec-
tion (11) excepts mortgages, deeds of trust, and security interests from
the statute's operation, and, like the easement exceptions, greatly re-
duces the act's utility. Since most security interests have a duration of
less than thirty years and are held by large financial institutions with
ample opportunity to adapt to the notice filing system, the advantages
accruing to these interests fail to warrant their exception from the thirty
year limitation.61
In theory, subsection (12), excepting interests registered under the
Torrens system, is compatible with the marketable title act concept
because it also facilitates safe land transfer. By registering the title to
land, instead of recording the evidence of title, the widespread use of
55Barnett, supra note 4, at 86.
5
'Note, The Minnesota Marketable Title Act: Analysis andArgumentfor Revision, 53 MINN.
L. REV. 1004, 1016-17 (1969).
'Id.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47B-3(3) (1973 Advance Legislative Service, pamphlet no. 3).
"Three United States Supreme Court cases have held that state recording statutes do not
apply to federal tax liens. United States v. Estate of Donelly, 397 U.S. 286 (1970); United States
v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 368 U.S. 291 (1961); Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243
U.S. 389 (1916).
"E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.53(G) (Page 1970); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 43-
30-13 (1967); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 601(b) (Supp. 1973).
aNote, 53 MINN. L. REV., supra note 56, at 1017.
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the Torrens system could make title transfer safer than marketable title
legislation. Since this laudable concept has found few adherents, how-
ever, its exception from the act will be significant only in the few eastern
counties that use it.62
The last exception, subsection (13), excepts equitable servitudes
that restrict property to residential use. By including this exception,
preservation of uniform residential sections through equitable servi-
tudes, patterned to function like zoning ordinances, prevailed over no-
tions favoring individual aspects of private ownership and court reluct-
ance to honor titles encumbered by equitable servitudes. 3
Section 47B-4 details the procedure by which claimants of extin-
guishable interests must affirmatively re-record them. This provision
avoids deprivation of property without due process by preventing the
arbitrary extinction of property rights. 4 Practically, it serves to insure
that only stale claims encumbering title needlessly will be eliminated by
allowing "live" ones to be preserved. 5 Its diminution of the act's utility
is negligible because the claims re-recorded are still discoverable among
the recent records. Significantly, holders under disability can have their
claims re-recorded by others.66 Also, the claim must contain "the name
of any record owner of the real property at the time the notice is regis-
tered" and be recorded in the grantor index under that name.67 This
assures that a title search beginning with the root of title will uncover
the re-recorded interest. 6
12Whitman, supra note 6, at 460-61.
61Swietck, The Law of Restrictions on Land in Wisconsin, 41 MARQUETTE L. REV. 227, 337-
38 (1957). Mecklenburg County was influential in the exception of equitable servitudes from the
operation of the act since large residential areas surrounding Charlotte fall outside the city limits
and beyond the jurisdiction of city zoning ordinances. Residential uniformity is maintained by
incorporating restrictions in individual deeds.
"For a discussion of the constitutionality of marketable title legislation see L. SINIEs & C.
TAYLOR, supra note 12, at 253-92. The constitutionality of the original Iowa statute was tested
and upheld in Lane v. Travelers Ins. Co., 230 Iowa 973, 299 N.W. 553 (1941) and again in Tesdell
v. Hanes, 248 Iowa 742, 82 N.W.2d 119 (1957). See Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 83
N.W.2d 800 (1957).
9"The proposed statute, in promoting the public interest that land should be made more freely
marketable and that the status of land titles should be more easily ascertainable, seeks to 'let the
dilatoriness of human nature take its toll' in extinguishing interests not seasonably re-recorded."
Webster, supra note 4, at 114. "It has been the experience of states with longterm marketable title
acts that few if any notices of claim are filed, thus indicating that few claims actually exist." L.
SIMES & C. TAYLOR, supra note 12, at 4.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47B-4(a) (1973 Advance Legislative Service, pamphlet no. 3).671d.
6P. BASYE, supra note 5, at 376.
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The final four provisions provide stiff penalties for those who file
false claims under the act, 9 state that the act will not disrupt the opera-
tion of existing statutes of limitation, 7 define terms and those to whom
the act applies, 7' and conclude that the act should be liberally con-
strued.72
CONCLUSION
The General Assembly's response to the conveyancing crisis by
passage of the North Carolina Marketable Title Act will render invalua-
ble service to all involved in real estate transactions. "No other remedial
legislation which has been enacted or proposed in recent years for the
improvement of conveyancing offers as much as the marketable title
act. It may be regarded as the keystone in the arch which constitutes
the structure of the modernized system of conveyancing." 73 Prior to
passage of the act, the title lawyer had to choose either to extend his
search back to a remote period and reduce the risk that an undiscovered
exception would later arise to haunt him or to risk a shorter search and
save the valuable time that perusal of ancient records demands. Since
the latter approach generally prevailed,74 the new act will drastically
reduce the likelihood of liability by assuring prima facie fee title after a
thirty year search. The concept of marketability will be more clearly
defined and conform more readily to modern needs of title transfer. The
frequency of quiet title suits and the requirement of quitclaim deeds to
remove old encumbrances will be greatly reduced.
Unfortunately, the quest to assure victory for the marketable title
legislation resulted in the loss of major battles to vested interests and
the concession of numerous and broad exceptions to the thirty year
limitation. As the act is implemented, however, and its value to those
engaged in real property transfer is recognized, advocates of the market-
able title act should take up arms once again and attempt to remove
these impediments to the full utility of the act.
EDWARD S. FINLEY, JR.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47B-6 (1973 Advance Legislative Service, pamphlet no. 3).
"Id. § 47B-7 (1973 Advance Legislative Service, pamphlet no. 3).
71d. § 47B-8 (1973 Advance Legislative Service, pamphlet no 3).
72Id. § 47B-9 (1973 Advance Legislative Service, pamphlet no. 3).
"L. SIMEs & C. TAYLOR, supra note 12, at 3.
"Whitman, supra note 6, at 424-29. "When [title] insurance is to be obtained, nearly three-
quarters of the attorneys follow the insurance firm's suggested sixty-year search. When no insur-
ance is involved, the sixty-year search becomes less popular, and most attorneys who forsake it
drop back to a forty-year search." Id. at 426.
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